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Abstract
International trade is currently under fire from many sides. Protectionist
trade policies are on the rise, putting an end to the decade-long march of
free trade. Making sense of the daily headlines and having an informed
opinion on your own has rarely been more important than it is now.
Our work aims to explain the driving forces behind international trade,
its history, how it shaped the world, its economic models, issues ranging from
job losses to the environment and why eating kangaroos is better than buying
local.
We summarize the most important academic literature on these topics in
a non-technical, educational manner. If the readers conclude that our report
has been useful in forming their own views on the pros and cons of interna-
tional trade and that they can ‘talk the talk’, we are gratified with the fruit
of our work.
Keywords: Introduction to international trade; history of trade; trade mod-
els; costs and benefits of trade; trade restrictions; free trade.
JEL classification: F1.
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1 Introduction
Adam Smith, a Scottish
economist who is often referred to
as the founder of modern economics,
claims that humans have the innate
“propensity to truck, barter and ex-
change one thing for another.” In
modern words: The willingness to
trade.
We trade if something else is more
desirable than what we have cur-
rently. Such a trade makes all parties
to the exchange better off. It is vol-
untary and only happens if all want
the trade to happen.
David Friedman, son of the Nobel
prize laureate Milton Friedman, said
there are two ways to build cars. The
obvious way is to use metal and ma-
chines to build cars. The other is to
put seeds into the field, let it grow,
harvest it, put it on board a ship and
send it across the ocean. When the
ship returns it is full of cars. Interna-
tional trade is the other way to pro-
duce cars without ever building a car
plant.
But international trade can have
forceful and long-lasting impact on
countries, peoples’ jobs and their
well-being. On the one hand, shop-
ping baskets and choice is larger and
goods cheaper and more plentiful,
thanks to international trade. Kiwis
from New Zealand, holidays abroad
– all results of and contributers to in-
ternational trade. On the other hand,
entire industries can disappear and
never return, and with it the jobs in
this sector.
The value of goods and services
traded between countries around the
world amounted to $23.01 trillion in
2018. World trade is larger than
the GDP of the United States. The
daily trade volume averages at a
value of approximately $63 billion,
higher than the annual GDP of Costa
Rica. These numbers are huge be-
cause trade around the world is im-
mense.
Yet hostility towards trade is com-
mon. Whether it be country leaders
(such as the current U.S. President)
who believe international trade can
damage the prospects and well-being
of their citizens, or climate activists
who promote buying local.
Our aim is to provide the read-
ers of our work with essential insights
into the basics of trade, its history,
its economic models and its impact
on people and the world. We believe
information rather than dogma is the
key to an informed debate. Addi-
tionally, we hope that the reader can
easily assess statements about trade
on their accuracy. After reading this
book we hope that every reader is
able to understand for instance why
the consumers are the ones paying
mostly for tariffs and not the export-
ing country. We hope that this book
enables the reader to lift the debate
about trade to a more informed level.
When you read our survey, we hope
you will be able to make up your own
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mind about trade and explain your
views to others.
Chapter 2 of this book deals with
trade throughout history, showing
that trade existed since the begin-
ning of mankind and that the world
as know it today was shaped by trade.
Empires rose and fell and with them
trade flows increased or decreased.
Our focus is mostly on Europe.
In Chapter 3 we explain trade
theories that try to explain the pat-
terns of trade and how trade emerges.
The chapter covers the classical trade
models devised by Adam Smith and
David Ricardo. It also covers the
modern trade models which emerged
throughout the 20th century and
amended the classical models in or-
der to make them more realistic.
Finally, Chapter 4 deals with
trade in our everyday live and the
many prejudices people hold against
trade, when it comes to jobs, labour
standards and the environment. Fur-
thermore, in this chapter we argue
that trade is often hijacked by special
interest groups and that as a result
protectionism in the modern world
persists despite the often-high costs
to consumers and producers abroad.
Literature. At the end of each
chapter we collect the main references
as well as comments and further read-
ing for specific sections. The liter-
ature listed in these sections is the
main source of the text, unless stated
otherwise. Links to webpages were
valid on September 12, 2019.
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2 History of Trade
Arthur W. Lewis, the first black
professor in the UK, who worked at
the University of Manchester, wrote
“If our subject is lowering its sights,
this may be because the demise of
economic history in economics de-
partments has brought us a gener-
ation of economists with no histori-
cal background.” This quote captures
beautifully a central issue. History
happened for us to learn from it and
to take it into account when forming
an opinion. However, when it comes
to trade it almost looks like people
think trade is a modern phenomenon,
and that the problems we face to-
day are unique to our time. None of
this is true. Trade and the exchange
of goods already did take place a
very, very long time ago. Even be-
fore ancient Greek and Roman times,
people traded. But even in ancient
times some people have been critical
of trade and did not believe that it
contributed to the common good.
Without trade some of the most
important discoveries and voyages of
our time would never have happened.
Columbus would have never acci-
dentally “discovered” the Americas.
Spain would never have established
colonies in Latin America. History
without trade is like a cheeseburger
without cheese. A brief overview, ex-
ploring reasons for trade since the
dawn of man, follows.
If this vets the readers’ interest
for more, then our recommendations
for further reading are Larry Neal
and Rondo Cameron’s book A Con-
cise Economic History of the World,
and Power and Plenty: Trade, war
and the world economy in the second
millennium by Ronald Findlay and
Kevin H. O’Rourke.
2.1 Trade at the dawn of
man
The first evidence of early exchange
taking place to procure obsidian,
which was distantly sourced to make
tools, dates back around 300,000
years. Other sources date early ex-
change networks back to 100,000 to
130,000 years ago when tools made
from obsidian were found in Tanza-
nia.
Remarkable is the distance be-
tween the source of obsidian and the
place where the tools were found:
200 miles. Not far by today’s stan-
dards but a vast distance for hunter-
gatherer groups who would encounter
other, potentially hostile tribes and
dangerous animals on their journey
through the wilderness. The idea of
a tribe or hunter traveling 200 miles
to bring home some obsidian sounds
rather improbable.
More likely it was trade that made
this happen. Not by individuals such
as merchants but as a group activity.
(The idea of individuals carrying out
trade as merchants will rise to promi-
nence only much later in history.) As
6
a group it was easier to avoid the dan-
gers of the Palaeolithic world. In or-
der to obtain goods that are not read-
ily available for a group they had to
trade with other groups that might
have access to the desired goods in
their territory.
Exchange between groups was not
necessarily always about everyday
items or items of practical use such as
obsidian. Goods that are exotic and
rare, like seashells which seems to had
ritual use and were hard to obtain,
were traded as well. Shell beads made
from seashells have been found in Mo-
rocco. What makes the finding so in-
teresting is that the beads were found
so far inland that the shells had to be
brought there intentionally and could
not have got there by natural force
alone. Similar findings have been
made in Algiers and Israel, showing
that sea shells have been used as ac-
cessory but more importantly that
countries started to develop exchange
networks very early.
Rivers played a crucial role in con-
necting the East and the West. Peo-
ple could use the rivers to travel far-
ther than on land. The Danube starts
in Germany and travels almost 3,000
kilometres until it reaches the Black
Sea at its Romanian coast. There is
evidence of trade on the Danube go-
ing back 35,000 years.
But trade and travel became a
much more important aspects of
everyday live approximately 10,000
years ago when people started set-
tling down, domesticated animals,
grew plants and founded villages.
Around that time people also gained
the ability to travel the seas. Evi-
dence of seafaring abilities date back
9,000 years in the Mediterranean.
With its many islands, it allowed for
trade even before the establishment
of cities or nations. Throughout the
next thousands of years, the Mediter-
ranean will be crucial for trade and
play an important role in most early
empires.
As soon as people settled down
and founded cities, trade became eas-
ier as goods where now able to travel
greater distances by moving from
tribe to tribe and therefore could
travel much greater distances. For ex-
ample, shells from India dating back
to 5,000 BCE were found 1,000 miles
away in Syria.
With the dawn of the Bronze Age
the first empires emerged and many
of them depended on import of raw
materials and the export of manufac-
tured goods. Trade patterns became
more complex and more long-distance
trade occurred. Trade was still dom-
inated by luxury goods and essential
raw materials that were worth to be
transported over long distances.
Empires such a Mesopotamia and
Egypt, both military powers in their
time, relied on long-distance trade for
export. Goods from Mesopotamia
were found in Syria as early as
5,300 BCE. There is also evidence
for trade relations between the In-
dus valley and Mesopotamia as early
as 3,500 BCE, which even predates
the Bronze Age. Egypt relied heav-
ily on Mesopotamian trade, import-
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ing mostly manufactured items such
as textiles and bronze goods.
During the Bronze Age empires
emerged, flourishing mostly through
their ability to trade rather than
through superior military power. In-
deed they relied on trade to sur-
vive. The Phoenicians were a civi-
lization mostly consisting of indepen-
dent city states that mastered the art
of sea travel and trade. In Greece
the Minoans were the first civilization
that traded with neighbouring islands
since Neolithic times. However, in the
middle of the first millennium BCE
Minoan culture began to weaken and
Mycenaean culture became the dom-
inant one in Greece.
Since 3,000 BCE sea trade be-
came more profitable as the big em-
pires needed vast amounts of raw ma-
terials to keep their economies go-
ing. Most of the trade consisted
of a complicated exchange of lux-
ury goods for raw materials and it
was the Phoenicians and Mycenaeans
that dominated the trade for the next
centuries. Ships and sailor knowledge
developed rapidly and by 2,300 BCE
the first large cargo vessels were ven-
turing on the Mediterranean.
Although the trading empires did
not possess vast natural resources,
they acted as important intermedi-
aries and facilitated trade between es-
tablished empires. Already in those
days, trade led to the creation of
wealth and power.
Despite its rapid increase, trade
mostly did not benefit the common
people. The benefactor of trade in
the ancient world were the state and
the elites. The state had to procure
raw materials to allow its industries
to flourish, and elites relied on trade
to maintain their privileged lifestyle.
It is believed that elites not only prof-
ited from trade but often encouraged
trade to enable them to obtain rare
and prestigious goods.
Most empires used trade to obtain
precious imports, not to create export
markets to allow their economies to
grow. Therefore, most empires exer-
cised strict controls on trade ensuring
that there wold be a steady inflow of
goods. Exports were nevertheless im-
portant as they were used to pay for
the huge inflow of goods. Often they
were more the means to an end.
Around 1,900 BCE the first pri-
vate merchants emerged. The best
documented case for private enter-
prises that participated in trade is
the old Assyrian trade network that
was privately held. Old clay tablets
show the relationship between differ-
ent merchants. Although private en-
terprises participated in trade, trade
itself was still heavily controlled by
the respective governments and it
would take over a thousand years be-
fore private entrepreneurs could oper-
ate independently.
The centre of trade and the world
economy during the Bronze age were
the early empires located around the
Mediterranean in Africa or Asia. Eu-
rope only started its ascend onto the
world stage of trade at the end of the
Bronze age when trade routes ranged
from Italy to Sweden.
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2.2 Greece on the rise
At the end of the Bronze age Europe
made its way onto the world stage in
form of Greek traders. Greece’s ter-
rain did not allow for the mass culti-
vation of wheat. It specialised mainly
in the export of olives, olive oil and
wine. Wheat was imported from all
around the Mediterranean. Greece’s
famed marketplaces (agoras) emerged
not only as the centre of Greek life
but as centre of trade.
Greece was divided in many inde-
pendent city states that all traded
independently from each other.
Corinth was one of those city states
and dominated much of the trade
in the 7th and 6th century BCE.
But soon Athens emerged as major
naval power and forced its way on
the global stage, surpassing Corinth
as major Greek city state. Trade
played an important part of every-
day Greek live. It was not always
seen as positive by influential Greek
philosophers.
Although the Greek started to
trade more, it was the Phoenicians
who continued to dominate the sea
and with it the trade throughout the
Mediterranean. Trade settlements
were established by the Phoenicians
throughout the Mediterranean in the
8th century BCE. Greek traders
would not do so for another 200 years.
Greeks however adopted techni-
cal terms in sailing and trade from
the Phoenicians as well as their al-
phabet; all to help trade. This will
not remain the only example where
trade has been essential in spread-
ing technology. In 814 BCE Phoeni-
cians founded Carthage, a city that
later played an important role in the
history of the Roman empire. But
the city’s main purpose was that of
a trading hub rather than of building
an empire.
From the 7th century BCE on-
wards, the Etruscans, located in mod-
ern day Italy, were another ma-
jor player in the international trade
game. The Mediterranean became
an area with active trade connec-
tions between many different empires
and city states. With increasing in-
tegration, trade became more com-
plex and a complicated system of ex-
ports and imports emerged. How-
ever, the rivalry between Greek city
states and the Phoenicians resulted
in chronic warfare between the Greek
and Phoenicians in the 6th cen-
tury. Throughout the first millen-
nium BCE the carrying trade, i.e.,
the practice of transporting goods
from A to B by carrying goods from
other nations on board your ships,
shifted slowly from the Phoenicians
to the Greek.
2.3 How Rome changed
trade
In 753 BCE Rome was founded (by
the violent death of Remus accord-
ing to Roman mythology) and it
soon became one of the most dom-
inant powers in the world history.
Rome expanded its territory contin-
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uously, bringing them into conflict
with Greece that had holdings on the
Italian peninsula and in Sicily. In the
end Rome with its superior military
army integrated Greece into its em-
pire. Greek, however, was not only
integrated into its empire but by ex-
tended trading privileges to the mer-
chants from the Greek city states,
Rome effectively integrated them into
its trading empire as well.
In 30 BCE Rome invaded Egypt,
and Alexandria soon became one of
the most important trading hubs for
Rome. Rome as well as other Greek
city states heavily relied on trade be-
cause they were only self-sufficient in
few goods and most goods had to
be imported. Wheat imports to feed
their population were especially cru-
cial. Feeding Rome’s growing popula-
tion required that shipments of wheat
from Egypt had to come on a regular
basis.
Although trade played a major
role in supporting cities or city states
and luxury goods were highly sought-
after, profits from trade profits could
be substantial. Especially with high
value goods like, silk from china and
other items that were crafted in far
away countries large profits could be
made. Despite this, trade was seen
as inferior to landowning. Money
and power was mostly gained by large
land estates. As a result, many Sena-
tors did think that trade was beneath
them. Whether they did so only in
public and privately participated in
trade trough freedman or slaves, is
still highly debated.
With the Roman empire’s sprawl,
its trading network grew as well
as the development of infrastructure
such as ports. Trade led to in-
creased specialisation within the em-
pire: grain imported from Egypt, oil
and olives came mostly from Spain,
and Italy exported wine and man-
ufactured goods. The Roman em-
pire also relied heavily on slave labour
and as a result the slave trade played
an important role in Roman times as
well.
Under the Pax Romana, streets
were built and sea traffic advanced.
Between 200 BCE and 200 CE, sea
traffic boomed and rose to a level
which was not matched in the fol-
lowing thousand years. At its peak,
the Roman empire controlled the en-
tire Mediterranean, and regular long-
distance trade as well as high sea
trade was established under Roman
rule. Long-distance trade stretched
as far as China and India. There is
evidence for Roman merchants in In-
dia and silk products that originated
in China came to Rome via the Silk
road.
With the invasion of Rome from
several barbarian tribes and the fall
of the Western Roman empire in 476,
trade started to diminish. It would
take centuries for trade to reach the
same level of sophistication as under
Roman rule.
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2.4 Rome’s fall shifted
trade to Africa
With the fall of the Roman em-
pire, the Islamic world gained in im-
portance. It was much more open
towards merchants than Christian-
ity. In the late 7th century, Arabs
and Persians traded with China and
porcelain overtook silk as main Chi-
nese export good. Trade also led to
the the exchange of technology. The
Indian numbering systems as well as
the technology required for silk pro-
duction, all found their way to the Is-
lamic world through trade.
Trade also spread religion, culture
and new consumer preferences. The
predominance of Islam throughout
sub-Saharan Africa can partially be
explained through trade with North-
African Muslims. The vast trading
network of the Islamic world led to
the adoption of Arabic as main lan-
guage throughout the Indian ocean.
Tea as well as sugar did not originate
in Europe but have reached Europe
first through trade.
During the early Middle Ages,
which followed the fall of Rome, long-
distance trade was mainly in luxury
goods and slaves. The trade was
mostly carried out by Syrians and
Jews. Jews in particular played an
important role as they facilitated the
trade between Christian Europe and
Islamic Africa.
2.5 Italy at it once again
Despite the fall of Rome, it have been
Italian cities that started to prosper
the most in the coming centuries. In
568, Venice was cut off from its hold-
ings on the mainland. Since these
used to supply Venice with wheat
and other raw materials, Venice was
forced into sea trade to survive. Due
to its strategic location, it linked
Byzantine and Europe, functioning as
an important entrepoˆt for goods com-
ing from the East.
The cities Genoa and Pisa also be-
longed to the so-called maritime re-
publics that dominated much of the
Mediterranean trade in the Middle
Ages. Muslim raids in the early 11th
century forced Genoa and Pisa to un-
tie forces and to protect each other by
building a navy. In 1284, when the
Muslims where long defeated, Genoa
defeated Pisa and solely controlled
the western Mediterranean where it
rivalled even Venice for the complete
control of the Mediterranean.
The beginnings of Venice were
humble, fishing and the production
of salt were the main economic ac-
tivities. But Venice soon established
itself as one of the most important
trading cities in the Mediterranean.
By the year 1,000 it was the first
city to solely rely on trade for its
survival. Venice was able to ex-
pand its trade with the Byzantine em-
pire in the late 11th century due to
a “golden bull”. This royal decree
(issued by the Byzantine emperor)
allowed Venice to trade freely with
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the Byzantine empire, without pay-
ing any taxes or other duties on their
traded goods, in return for support
against the rising Norman power in
south Italy.
At their prime the Italian city
states were the cultural centres of Eu-
rope, dominated the trade between
East and West and particularly the
trade with China. Then Italian city
states sparked a financial big bang by
creating banking systems. A main
reason to establish banks was to fi-
nance trade voyages which were very
expensive.
Before banking and credit
emerged, traders worked for their
own account. It required huge sums
of fixed capital to start a trading voy-
age. Originally retired merchants
were willing to finance such trips.
But as trade grew steadily and be-
came more and more complex, fi-
nancing institutions emerged. These
allowed a vast network of partners
and therefore were able to finance
more voyages. Overall trade in-
creased massively between 1150 and
1250, and Italian cities had monop-
olies on many exotic goods. Most
prominently they had the monopoly
on the lucrative spice trade.
2.6 Bye Europe, Hi Asia
In the early 13th century the Mon-
gols under Genghis Khan conquered a
vast empire which was set to become
the largest contiguous empire in his-
tory. During this time the Pax Mon-
golica was established under which
trade flourished.
Trade routes became safer and
could be used day and night, with-
out fear of bandits. But it was still
a long journey for traders: It took
between 8 and 11 months to reach
China from Crimea. Due to the dif-
ficulty of the trip and the huge cost
associated, mostly goods that had a
high ratio of value to weight, such as
spices and silk, were traded over such
a long distance.
It was possible to make enor-
mous profits despite the long journey.
Customs duties and travel expenses
could amount to 3,500 florins (more
than one million pounds in today’s
money, although exact estimates on
the Florentine’s florin value are lack-
ing). The obtained goods could then
be sold at a profit of 25,000 florins. A
return on investment of over 700%.
It was also during the Pax Mon-
golica when Marco Polo, a Venetian
merchant and one of the most famous
explorers, travelled to China and met
Kublai Khan.
By 1335 the Pax Mongolica
started to disintegrate. With it
trade with China decreased. The
Black Death, which devastated Eu-
rope by wiping out between 30% to
60% of Europe’s population, origi-
nated in central Asia and was brought
to Crimea via the Silk route, from
where it spread throughout Europe.
But it was the Islamic empire that
suffered the most during this time.
Economic stagnation as well as the
Black Death dealt its economy fatal
blows. It was Europe that would re-
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cover first, exporting manufactured
goods, while the Islamic world would
provide the raw materials.
2.7 The age of explo-
ration, voyages and
multinationals
Throughout the later Middle Ages
notable progress in the art of ship-
building and sailing was made. Ships
got larger with more room for cargo,
easier to manoeuvre and able to
travel larger distances. Inventions
like the compass, which originated
in China and found its way to Eu-
rope, as well as progress in cartog-
raphy made exploring the seas and
travelling with ships much easier and
safer.
The Italians had the advantage in
the art of navigating and as early
as 1291 a Genoese expedition tried
to reach India by sailing around the
Cape of Good Hope at the southern
end of Africa. However this expedi-
tion was lost, never to be seen again.
It were the Portuguese who would be
the first nation to find a way to India
from Europe via the sea.
Prince Henry of Portugal, also
known as the “Navigator”, was one
of the most important figures in the
early history of discovery and voy-
ages. From 1418 until his death in
1460 he sent expeditions almost an-
nually, founding trade relationships
all along the African coast. But most
importantly his work laid the foun-
dation for later Portuguese discover-
ies. In 1481 King John II came to the
throne and restored the policies of ex-
ploration. Under his reign, Portugal
was able to round the Cape of Good
Hope in 1488.
It was Spain though that made
the most famous discovery. The dis-
covery of the Americas. In 1492
the Spanish crown agreed to fi-
nance an expedition of a Genoese ex-
plorer to find a sea route to India.
This Genoese explorer was Christo-
pher Columbus and his story is well
known. Instead of reaching India to
establish a sea route for the spice
trade, he “discovered” the Americas.
Spanish settlements were estab-
lished in Hispaniola and Cuba. In
1497 Vasco da Gama, a Portuguese
explorer, set sail to find a sea route
to India in order to establish trade
relations with the country that pro-
duced the highly sought-after spices.
It took two years for the expedition
to be completed.
In 1499 da Gama finally returned
to Lisbon, and was greeted as a hero.
Despite the loss of two ships and over
half of his crew members and the fail-
ure to establish a commercial treaty
with Calicut (a main objective), the
voyage was seen as a success. The
spices and other goods on board of
the returning ships showed the poten-
tial richness that could be harboured
by using this route. By 1513 the Por-
tuguese ventured even further and ar-
rived in Canton, South China. By
the middle of the 16th century they
opened up trade relations with Japan
as well.
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Spain was not idle during this
time. After Columbus claimed terri-
tories in the Americas in the name of
the Spanish Crown, Spain continued
to explore. In 1519 Ferdinand Magel-
lan tried to complete what Columbus
never achieved: reaching the Spice
Island by sailing west around South
America. He died on this journey, but
this expedition resulted in the first
circumnavigation of the world.
In 1521 Hernan Cortes defeated
the Aztec Empire, establishing New
Spain. By 1532 Francisco Pizarro de-
feated the Incas in 1530s, establishing
New Castile. Spain controlled almost
all of the Americas except for Brazil
which was discovered and claimed by
Portugal in 1500.
It is important to recall that
all these discoveries and expeditions
where conducted with the goal of
establishing profitable trade routes,
and with it to bring new riches to
the old world. Without trade and
the prospect of new trade routes,
these discoveries might never have
happened.
Spain imported mostly gold and
silver from its colonies, which laid
its foundation as the richest empire
in Europe. But Spain also imported
maize, tobacco, potatoes and other
exotic fruits. In return it exported
cattle, pigs, sheep and horses.
Europe also exported sugar cane
to the New World, which was orig-
inally not known there. Due to a
more suitable climate, the trade flow
would soon reverse with sugar being
exported to Europe. Vast supply of
sugar led to a decrease in price that
allowed ordinary Europeans to con-
sume this delicacy (to the detriment
of dental health).
Sugar cane was also one of the
main Brazilian exports to Portugal.
Portugal also imported vast amounts
of spices from its holdings in the East.
In order to maintain the large in-
crease in production of sugar cane
in the new world, large numbers of
slaves were required. By 1600 there
was a regular slave trade from Africa
to the New World.
2.8 Netherlands’ way to
domination
The Netherlands have been a part of
the Spanish monarchy since 1556. In
1581 they established the Republic of
the Seven United Netherlands. The
Dutch Republic was a merchant oli-
garchy, very much like the Italian city
states. But with a much larger pop-
ulation and more land, which could
be used for agricultural production.
Of the approximately 40,000 ships en-
tering and leaving the Baltic Sea be-
tween the 15th and the mid-17th cen-
tury, 60% were Dutch.
Innovation in shipping, most no-
tably the fluyt, a cargo vessel de-
signed in the shipyards of Hoorn,
which greatly increased the carrying
capacity while at the same time re-
ducing labour cost, allowed the Dutch
Republic to keep freight rates low and
therefore could drive most competi-
tors out of the carrying trade market.
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Access to goods that could be carried
was paramount. One of those was the
spice market in Lisbon which was un-
der Spanish rule since 1580. Access
to Lisbon’s harbour could be cut off
at any time. This happened twice in
1585 and 1595.
A long-term solution that did
not leave the Dutch at the whim
of the Spanish Monarchy was to es-
tablish their own spice-trading net-
work. A group of Amsterdam mer-
chants set up the Compagnie van
Verre (roughly translated as “long-
distance company”), with the goal to
break the Portuguese spice monopoly.
In 1595 the first expedition was
sent to Java (one of the most impor-
tant spice markets in the world) con-
sisting of a fleet of 4 ships. Only
3 and less than half the crew re-
turned in 1597. The amount of spices
brought back were sufficient to con-
sider the expedition a success though.
Another expedition was sent to pro-
cure spices in 1598, consisting of 22
ships financed by 5 different merchant
groups. They returned in 1599 with
enough spices for the financiers to
make a 400% profit.
In 1600 the English East In-
dia Company (EIC) was formed in
Britain, in response to the expedi-
tions by the Dutch and the fear to fall
behind. It was granted a monopoly
on all trade from England to the east.
Further Dutch expeditions as well as
the increased competition from the
EIC led to an oversupply of spices.
Prices plummeted in Europe while
the price of spices at the source in-
creased.
To protect the Dutch mer-
chants from the ruinous competi-
tion, the Dutch East India Company
(Verenigde OostIndische Compagnie
or VOC in short) was formed. It ob-
tained a monopoly for the trade with
the East Indies for 21 years. The
VOC was one of the first multina-
tional companies, combining trading
activity with production activity. It
dominated entire areas which were
necessary for the production of spices.
In 1619 the VOC founded the city
of Batavia (today’s Jakarta), its new
headquarter, which was rebuild com-
pletely after the previous city was
burned to the ground by the Dutch.
The VOC was a huge success. The
number of ships sent to the East In-
dies from the Netherlands increased
sharply and the share price of the
VOC rose fourfold. By 1669 the
VOC was the most powerful company
in the world. It had vast executive
rights granted by the Dutch govern-
ment, it had its own army and its own
holdings overseas.
In the Atlantic, the Dutch were
present as well. Just like in the East
Indies, competition between Dutch
merchants reduced profits. An inte-
grated stock company (just like the
VOC) was formed in 1621, called
the West-Indische Compagnie (Dutch
West India Company), WIC for
short. WIC did try to establish the
same from of dominance that the
VOC established in the East Indies,
but it failed. Facing both the Por-
tuguese and Spanish fleet, proved too
15
much. As a result, it focused on
peaceful trading after 1647, where the
WIC found a highly profitable niche,
the slave trade.
2.9 Global Mercantilism
The 17th and the early 19th cen-
tury were time periods characterised
by a struggle for power and colonial
territories between European nations.
In the middle of the 17th century it
looked like the Dutch were having the
upper hand. Their low freight rates
drove out the competition. Their su-
periority in ship manufacturing al-
lowed them to maintain dominance
over much of the sea trade worldwide.
In 1651 and 1660 the UK passed
two laws, the Navigation Acts. They
essentially required all trade between
England and its Colonies to be trans-
ported on board of English vessels. In
1663 the Staple Act required all Euro-
pean goods destined for the colonies
to be first transported to England,
where they were inspected and then
transported to the colonies - but only
on board of English ships.
The struggle for dominance in the
sea trade led to several wars between
the English and the Dutch. But nei-
ther the first nor the second Anglo-
Dutch War were decisive in establish-
ing superiority of any of the two na-
tions.
With France another powerful
player emerged. France raised tariffs
for Dutch products in 1664 and 1667.
The Dutch retaliated and a full-scale
trade war broke out with ever ris-
ing tariffs. It resulted in the Franco-
Dutch war of 1672. In 1678, Louis
XIV of France emerged as the most
powerful monarch in Europe. The
English and French would continue to
clash in the coming decades: in the
Nine Years’ War from 1689 – 1697
and in the War of the Spanish Suc-
cession from 1701–1713. Wars were
often used to raise tariffs on goods in
order to finance the huge war machin-
ery necessary to fight wars.
The continuous struggle between
European nations for power led to a
set of policies known as mercantilism.
Mercantilist policies arose as early as
1480 and would dominate the poli-
tics from the 16th to the 18th cen-
tury. The mercantilist doctrine was
that there is a strong relationship be-
tween power and wealth.
Wealth, often measured by the
amount of precious metals available
to a nation, was seen as necessary to
obtain power. Wealth could fund ef-
fective naval as well as military forces,
winning wars and securing control
over markets or other trade monop-
olies. Colonies played an important
role as supplier of raw material and
market of manufactured goods.
Mercantilist nations in those days
were locked in a zero-sum game where
one nation can win only if someone
else loses.
Mercantilism differed slightly
from country to country. But six
main policies were at the economic
core of almost every country:
• The export of precious metals
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such as gold and silver was for-
bidden. These were needed to
pay for an army. Exporting
these would result in empower-
ing another country.
• Import restrictions were put in
place to restrict the import of
manufactured goods and only
allow the import of raw ma-
terials. The import of cheap
raw materials would lower the
cost of producing manufactured
goods, But the import restric-
tion on manufactured goods in-
tended to promote the coun-
try’s own industry and harming
the industry of rivalling coun-
tries.
• Exports of manufactured goods
were encouraged, for the same
reasons as stated above.
• Export of raw materials was re-
stricted so that they were used
at home to produce higher value
manufactured goods. At the
same time limiting the capabil-
ity of other countries to manu-
facture goods.
• Technological export was re-
stricted in order hinder the
emergence of foreign competi-
tion.
• Navigation Laws were passed
in many countries, mandating
that most foreign trade had to
be carried on domestic ships.
This should ensure that the lo-
cal shipping and shipbuilding
industry was stimulated, which
was necessary in the event of
war.
Although the Navigation Acts
helped the UK to establish itself as
one of the leading European nations,
mercantilism was not effective and
struggled to bring prosperity to Eu-
rope. The increased protection of sec-
tors also led to losses in competitive-
ness. Spain for example protected
their clothing sector from 1552 to
1555. Then the protection was lifted.
Within these few years, the Spanish
clothing sector lost its competitive-
ness and Spain became an importer
of clothing.
2.10 Game-changing UK
As we saw above, the 17th century
was dominated by ongoing conflicts
between the leading nations in Eu-
rope, and many wars were fought be-
tween them. Despite the rise of mer-
cantilist policies, the Dutch empire
was one of the few havens of free
trade in Europe. Compared to its
larger and more populous neighbours,
the Netherlands did not participate in
mercantilist policies and were an im-
portant marketplace. However, there
was one major exception to this prac-
ticed freedom. The Dutch colonial
empire, the VOC as well as the WIC
had monopoly power of the trade
with the Dutch colonies and, there-
fore, no other country was allowed to
trade with the colonies.
The British followed the example
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set by the Dutch. By passing the
Navigation Acts it quasi-monopolised
trade with its colonies as well. It was
a huge success for the UK. Before the
English civil war 80% of exports con-
sisted of woollen cloth. By 1700 how-
ever that figure had fallen to less than
half of all exports due to an increase
in colonial reexport of goods which
was made possible by the Navigation
Acts.
England and France were involved
in a series of wars starting the late
15th century. Conflicts between the
two nations lingered on until the early
19th century. In order to raise rev-
enue for these wars and to maintain
its expensive fleet, England had to
raise taxes at home as well as in the
colonies.
The raise of taxes led to the U.S.
Declaration of Independence in 1776.
The war of independence in the U.S.
left the UK as well as France heavily
indebted. The fourth Anglo-Dutch
War from 1780-1784 led to a decisive
English victory, establishing English
superiority on the sea. It exacerbated
the decline of the VOC, once the most
powerful company on earth. In 1799
the Dutch East India Company was
formally dissolved and, with it, the
Dutch ceased to be a dominant su-
perpower in Europe.
Although the Navigation Acts
helped the UK to establish itself as
one of the leading European nations,
mercantilism was not effective and
struggled to bring prosperity to Eu-
rope. The increased protection of sec-
tors also led to losses in competitive-
ness. Spain for example protected
their clothing sector from 1552 to
1555. Then the protection was lifted.
Within these few years, the Spanish
clothing sector lost its competitive-
ness and Spain became an importer
of clothing.
The end of mercantilist policies
and the following more peaceful 19th
century helped to deliver a trade
boom that brought prosperity to Eu-
rope.
2.11 Age of free trade
In 1750 the industrial revolution
started in Britain. Adam Smith
published The Wealth of Nations in
1776, arguing forcefully against mer-
cantilist policies. Strong indepen-
dence movements in Latin America in
the late 18th century resulted in the
loss of colonial holdings there for Eu-
ropean nations. The French Revolu-
tion in 1789 brought turmoil to one of
the biggest and most powerful coun-
tries in the World. The 18th century
was a time of change and develop-
ment, but it would be the 19th cen-
tury that really promoted trade.
The beginning of the 19th century
experienced the Napoleonic Wars, a
period lasting from 1803 until 1815.
After the war European borders were
redrawn, the Spanish colonial em-
pire collapsed due to the indepen-
dence movements in Latin America.
and Britain once again cemented its
standing as the superior power in Eu-
rope.
At the end of the Napoleonic
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wars, the UK was responsible be-
tween one fourth to one third of total
international commerce. In the im-
mediate aftermath of the Napoleonic
wars, Europe was mostly protection-
ist, except for small countries such as
the Netherlands and Denmark.
Britain passed the controversial
Corn Laws in 1815 in response to
falling wheat prices after the war,
which resulted in an exclusion of for-
eign wheat from the British market.
The industrial revolution in
Britain did not only lead to a su-
perior British manufacturing, it also
led to better infrastructure in Britain.
Better roads cut the travel time from
Manchester to London to less than
half. The first fully functioning rail-
way steam-locomotive was built in
Britain in 1804, and in 1830 the first
public railroad using only steam op-
erated railroads was built to connect
Liverpool and Manchester.
Soon other European countries as
well as the United States and Canada
followed and built their own railways
systems. The railway was not the
only important transport invention
in the 19th century. In 1807 the
steamship was developed in the U.S.
The first regular transatlantic ser-
vice began in 1838 from England to
New York. However, it would take
until the mid-19th century to make
steamships a breakthrough innova-
tion in trade. The invention of the
screw propeller, the compound en-
gine and the steel hull helped to re-
place sailing ships in the transport of
goods.
Before these innovations,
steamships were mainly used to
transport people and high-value
goods. With the opening of the Suez
Canal in 1869, steamships had an-
other breakthrough. Sailing ships
were not able to use the canal. Be-
cause of unfavourable winds, they
would had to be towed through the
canal, whereas steamships did not
rely on wind.
In 1866 the first transatlantic tele-
gramme line opened, linking London
with New York, which led to immense
increase in the speed of communica-
tion. In 1875 refrigerator technology
was developed, enabling the export
of fresh meat from Argentina, New
Zealand and the U.S. to Europe.
As a result of these transport in-
ventions, freight rates fell dramati-
cally. Between 1740 and 1840 freight
rates were roughly constant. But be-
tween 1840 and 1910 they dropped by
70%, leading to a dramatic increase
in trade. Between 1800 and 1903 the
volume of trade worldwide increased
20-fold. Trade grew much faster than
world production. Three quarters of
that trade was concentrated within
Europe.
Other reasons contributed to the
expansion of trade in the 19th cen-
tury. A series of trade policies were
directed towards opening the mar-
kets. The first major European na-
tion that started to open up their
markets was Britain. In the wake
of the industrial revolution, Britain
started to move away from its mer-
cantilist policy. It repealed the Nav-
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igation Acts in 1818 and, by 1830,
only a few industrial tariffs and re-
strictions remained.
The most notable obstacle to free
trade remained the hugely protected
agricultural sector. It would take un-
til 1846 until the Corn Laws were re-
pealed. The UK had completed its
turn towards free trade. It led to a
chain reaction. Other countries fol-
lowed and liberalised trade as well,
for example Spain and Austria.
Throughout the 1850s average
tariffs were falling and, in 1860, the
Cobden-Chevalier treaty, a free trade
agreement between France and the
UK further promoted the case of free
trade. The treaty included a so-called
most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause,
which means that if they negotiate a
new trade agreement with other na-
tion, the new tariffs will automati-
cally apply to all other partners with
an MFN clause.
If, say, the UK were to negoti-
ate a trade agreement with Spain and
grants Spain better tariff conditions.
Then these better tariff conditions
would automatically apply to French
goods as well due to MFN.
The inclusive nature of MFN
probably had a substantial impact
on the speed at which tariffs were
reduced. By the 1870s, tariffs had
fallen to some 9-12% on the European
mainland. 1846-1880 was the age of
free trade.
Although in Europe free trade
was dominating, it was not the most
prominent form of policy around the
world. The U.S. as well as Australia
maintained high tariff walls for much
of the 19th century. China was forced
by Britain to stay open and allow fur-
ther opium trade. Japan was forced
open in 1853 by the U.S. marine.
Japan, which had been living in al-
most complete autarky over two cen-
turies, saw foreign trade rose 70-fold
in the following fifteen years Latin
America also maintained high tariffs,
which were among the highest in the
world. After most countries gained
their independence from their colo-
nial rulers, they struck of their colo-
nial restrictions and started to raise
tariffs in order to generate revenue.
For Europe a turning point in free
trade was reached when cheap grain
from the New World as well as Rus-
sia led to a fall in grain prices. De-
mands for protection grew in many
countries. In Germany the land-
owning agricultural elite first pro-
moted free trade, but now facing a
fall in prices, demanded protection-
ist measures. After 1878 most ma-
jor countries in Europe - except for
Britain - had reversed their initial free
trade policy and reverted back to pro-
tectionism.
Denmark did not resort to protec-
tionist measure but decided to mod-
ernize their economy and become an
exporter of animal products, while
importing cheap gain from abroad.
However, most other European coun-
tries, where the land-owning elite was
often powerful, such as France and
Sweden, followed the example set by
Germany and raised tariffs. High tar-
iffs meant high grain prices.
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In the U.S., northern manufactur-
ers demanded protection from their
European competition whereas the
agricultural South demanded free
trade to sell their products to Europe.
With the North winning the civil war,
the path to high industrial tariffs was
clear.
Despite the protectionist mea-
sures, shipping tonnage between 1870
and 1900 tripled, the value of exports
between 1850 and 1900 quintupled
and then doubled from 1900 to 1914.
Overall trade continued to grow by
4% annually in the last half of the
19th century.
It is perhaps surprising but the
19th century was more globalizing
than the 20th century. Despite pro-
tectionist measures! Throughout the
19th century the ratio of exports to
GDP grew more rapidly than in the
20th century. The 19th century was
also a time of great specialisation;
Europe was the main producer of
industrial goods. Asia and Africa
where the main exporter of raw ma-
terials. The first World War in 1914-
1918 brought the European trade to
a halt. It would take until well after
the second World War until the world
would be as connected as before.
2.12 Rough 20th century
The first World War led to an
end of the liberal economic order.
Most countries had started to revert
back to protectionist measures ear-
lier. Even Britain, the champion of
for free trade, passed legislation such
as the McKenna Tariff and the Safe-
guarding of Industries Act which re-
sulted in increased protectionism.
Throughout the war, governments
actively managed the economy as
well as trade, regulating which goods
could be exported and imported.
Throughout the first World War,
trade decreased and the overall vol-
ume of trade plunged. Britain lost its
role as economic superpower and was
overtaken by the U.S. which emerged
from World War I as most powerful
economic nation in the world.
European producers increased
production in order to meet wartime
demand for goods. Many non-
European producers of raw materi-
als also expanded their production
in order to meet Europe’s war time
demand. Additionally, countries that
relied on Europe for the import of
manufactured goods started to estab-
lish their own manufacturing indus-
tries as Europe was unwilling and un-
able to export crucial manufactured
goods.
Both industries suffered from
overcapacity when the war ended.
Too much supply on the world market
meant dropping prices. Manufactur-
ing industries demanded protection
from the European competition after
the war has ended due to their lack
of competitiveness.
European companies demanded
protection because they could not re-
cover their lost export markets. In
agriculture, demand for protection-
ism rose as well. The U.S. had sup-
plied much of Europe with cheap
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grain throughout the war. But as
agriculture in Europe recovered from
the war, prices plummeted due to an
oversupply of grain.
Unsurprisingly, the average tariff
levels in the middle of the 1920s were
far higher than they were in 1913
shortly before World War I broke out.
2.13 Global problems,
global solutions
With the outbreak of the Great
Depression in 1929 the problems
of declining industries were exacer-
bated, and governments were pushed
towards greater tariff protection.
World trade decreased by two-thirds
during the Great Depression. In
1930, the U.S. passed the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff that raised protection
in industry as well as agriculture. It
resulted in a chain reaction as other
nations erected further trade barriers.
The U.S. was not the unilateral
protector and promoter of free trade
as Britain was in the 19th century.
Overall trade grew much slower be-
tween World War I and II than dur-
ing half the century preceding World
War I. Trade in manufactured goods
as well as in primary products fell. It
was a time of increased economic na-
tionalism which resulted in reverting
back to mercantilist policies.
With the start of World War II
trade once again came to a halt.
In 1939 trade between the warring
nations completely stopped. Trade
within the axis and allied powers
probably increased. The war – and
with it the increased demand for
goods in Europe – led to a huge in-
crease in exports by the U.S. and
Canada.
The economic outlook in Europe
after World War II was bleak. There
were extensive property damages, in-
dustrial production was half of what
it was before World War II and agri-
cultural production was lagging as
well.
After World War II the U.S.
once again cemented their status
as the world’s foremost superpower.
Although another powerful player
emerged, the Soviet Union.
The Marshall plan in 1947
granted Europe much needed finan-
cial help. In return economic reforms
were demanded that steered most of
Western and middle Europe towards
free markets and free trade, there-
fore aiding economic integration in
Europe.
Although the Soviet Union was
initially invited to participate as well,
they withdraw after the first round
and pressured Czechoslovakia and
Poland which accepted subsequent
invitations to decline as well. The re-
sult was an economic East-West di-
vide. The Soviet Union withdrew it-
self from most emerging international
organizations. And with it from con-
tinuous international economic inte-
gration.
Even before the second World
War officially ended, the leaders of
the allied nations came together in
Bretton Woods to establish a series
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of rules for the post war international
monetary system. Besides the cre-
ation of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (IBRD), also known as the
World Bank, the Bretton Woods con-
ference laid the foundation for the
creation of the international trade or-
ganization (ITO).
A charter for the ITO was estab-
lished, in which basic rules for inter-
national trade were laid out. The
Charter was signed in 1948 in Ha-
vana but was never ratified by the
U.S. Without the support of the U.S.,
the ITO never came to life.
However, in 1947 twenty-three na-
tions signed the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade which was part
of the ITO negotiations. Due to the
failure to establish the ITO, GATT
was used as framework in which trade
deals and other economic policies
were negotiated. It was replaced by
the WTO in 1995. Although GATT
was less than many countries had
hoped for, its membership increased
from its initial 23 members to more
than 82 only two decades later.
GATT brought back the MFN
clause, pledged to reduce tariffs and
outlawed import or export quotas
(restrictions on amounts). Less de-
veloped countries that joined that
GATT were not required to com-
pletely open to trade as the GATT
agreement allowed protection for
countries with low standards of liv-
ing.
Under GATT a number of con-
ferences were held to reduce tariffs.
The first round in Geneva, where the
agreement was signed, was a suc-
cess as 123 bilateral agreements were
reached. However, in most of the fol-
lowing rounds, only a few new trade
agreements were reached. Although
new member states signed the treaty,
the process of reducing trade barri-
ers stalled. It would take until the
Kennedy round in the 1960s to revi-
talize the process and tariffs were cut
again.
2.14 Trade and Cold War
In 1949 the U.S. passed the Ex-
port Control Act which controlled the
goods and the quantities sold by the
U.S. worldwide. To enforce the law,
the U.S. had to rely on its allies. In
1950, after the Korean civil war broke
out and Mao Zedong had brought en-
tire China under his control, the U.S.
as well as its European allies imple-
mented an export blockade to harm
communist development. The Cold
War had begun.
Europe realised that in order to
preserve peace and ensure economic
growth it had to integrate. In
1957 the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) was created. A com-
mon market was created between the
Benelux countries, France, Germany
and Italy, slashing all tariffs between
them in 1968. In 1960 the European
Free trade Area (EFTA) was created
and it came into effect six years later
in 1966.
In 1992 the European Economic
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Area was created by a merger of
the EEC and the EFTA. It came
into effect in 1994. A further step
was taken towards European inte-
gration and free trade. In the two
decades from 1950 until 1970, trade
grew worldwide at an average 8% per
year. One of the highest continued in-
creases in worldwide trade in history.
2.15 Autarky at an end
In 1978 China opened its economy to
the world markets. Throughout the
late 1980s and the beginning of the
1990s, Latin America started to lib-
eralize their economies, cut budget
deficits and eliminated restrictions on
trade.
The Soviet Union collapsed in
1991, reminding the world that eco-
nomic autarky is not the solution.
Economic liberalization and integra-
tion are enabling countries to grow
and succeed.
Developments in transportation
leading to bigger and better ships,
but most importantly, containerisa-
tion lowered transportation cost by
up to 90%.
Before container were used, goods
were transported in bulk. That
meant ships had to be loaded and
unloaded by hand, which resulted in
high cost due to the hours of labour
needed and the time that ships spend
idle in harbours. It required 150
or more longshoremen working for at
four days to load and unload a ship.
The UK was the first country
to start containerisation in the early
18th century when containers were
used to transport coal. However,
the break-through in containerisation
happened in the mid-20th century
when Malcom McLean developed a
shipping container that could be ef-
ficiently loaded and secured onboard
of ships. With this invention the way
was cleared for standardised contain-
ers as we still know them today.
Ships loading the newly developed
containers were able to be unloaded
and loaded by 14 men in one day.
This resulted in immense savings and
therefore increased the profitability of
shipping companies. As McLean him-
self said: “A ship earns money only
when she’s at sea”.
The increase in trade brought
many advantages to consumers.
There was an increase in the vari-
ety of goods available to them. Kiwis
from New Zealand became a regu-
lar fruit in supermarkets around the
world. Lower prices due to increased
international competition. Better
quality compared to purely domes-
tic supply as well.
On the other hand, global inequal-
ity rose when prices for raw materials
and agricultural products dropped in
the 1980s and 1990s. This resulted
in high unemployment in poor coun-
tries.
At the end of the 20th century, au-
tarky, which prevailed for much the
first half of the century, was a thing of
the past. Trade was freer and the ra-
tio of world trade to GDP was greater
than ever before. This age showed
that development and economic liber-
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alisation could go hand in hand, im-
port substitution used most promi-
nently in India and Latin America,
although sometimes initially success-
ful, proved to be inefficient and un-
successful in the long run.
Adding a grain of salt, one should
not forget that the United Kingdom
had higher tariff protection for man-
ufacturing in place in 2000 than they
had before World War I.
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3 Trade Models
3.1 Why countries trade
Trade started with the dawn of
man and is a driving force behind ex-
ploration and the relations between
countries. This is the main message
of the previous chapter.
Often the reason for trade is ob-
vious. Country A has sea access
and can sell fish to country B which
has beautiful forests with many dear
that can be hunted and its meat
sold to country A. Both countries ob-
tain goods they did not have before
they traded with each other. Every-
one is happier. If you buy a new
mobile phone in the UK, chances
are that it is imported; the same
is true for bananas and many other
fruits. Although the UK climate is
not really suited to growing bananas,
with greenhouses it would certainly
be possible to do so. Phones could
easily be manufactured in the UK as
well.
So why is the UK importing
rather than producing mobile phones
and bananas? To explain such trade
patterns, we resort to the most use-
ful tool in economics: A model.
Economists are obsessed with mod-
els and they try to model everything
with the goal of assessing and predict-
ing the real world. Gary Becker even
tried to explain the economic ratio-
nale behind dating, marriage and the
number of children in families .
Models are a simplification of re-
ality; often a gross simplification one
should add. But we will learn how
they can help us to gain insights into
how trade works and the intuition be-
hind trade patterns.
3.2 Absolute advantage
The Scottish economist Adam Smith,
revered as one of the founding fa-
thers of modern economics, promi-
nently wrote about free trade in 1776.
He outlined a theory why countries
trade in his famous book The Wealth
of Nations, known today as the the-
ory of absolute advantage. Absolute
advantage is a simple yet beautiful
concept which says: If I can pro-
duce something better or more effi-
cient than somebody else, I will do it
and the other will not. If I can mow a
lawn in half the time than my neigh-
bour John who needs an hour, I have
the absolute advantage in mowing a
lawn. However, if John cleans dishes
twice as fast as me (coincidentally I
need an hour for this chore), John
has an absolute advantage cleaning
dishes.
Suppose John and I want to meet
for a pint at the local pub on Sun-
day. But before our partners give
their permission for us to leave for the
pub, we have to mow lawns and clean
dishes. Of course, we want to spend
as little time as possible on our chores
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and as much time as possible at the
pub. A smart reader will immediately
realise what John and I should do.
We should swap our chores. I should
mow John’s and my lawn, and John
should do his and my dishes. We will
both be done in an hour, saving 30
minutes each.
In such a win-win situation only
our partners’ objections “you stay at
home until the work is done” can pre-
vent us from realising this mutually
beneficial plan. Autarky, the state
in which we do not trade but slog it
out ourselves, is clearly inferior to one
where we can trade.
Let us transfer this illustrative
example to a more complex envi-
ronment: Trade between countries.
We construct a simple model: As-
sume there are only two countries
with made-up names, the VL and Di-
job who produce two goods, fish and
cooking oil with labour as the only in-
put to the production process. This
means it only needs labour to produce
fish as well as oil. In the VL it takes
8 hours to produce one large drum of
cooking oil and 4 hours to catch one
barrel of fish. In Dijob it only takes 4
hours to produce the drum of oil but 8
hours to catch that much fish. Work-
ers in each country want to consume
both goods each day. Let us organize
the data in a table:
Country Fish Oil
VL 4 8
Dijob 8 4
Absolute advantage, as explained
above, means one country can pro-
duce a good more efficient than the
other country. The table says Dijob
is better at producing oil and the VL
is better at producing fish. So Di-
job has an absolute advantage in pro-
ducing oil and the VL has an abso-
lute advantage producing fish. Let
us do a thought-experiment: If the
VL produces one fewer drum of oil, 8
hours of work are freed up. In these
8 hours, 2 additional barrels of fish
can be produced. In Dijob 8 hours
of work are freed up for each barrel
of fish not produced, allowing to pro-
duce 2 drums of oil.
During a single 8 hour work day,
the average VL worker produces 1
barrel of fish and half a drum of oil
whereas a worker in Dijob produces 1
drum of oil and half a barrel of fish.
This is the situation under autarky
where no trade occurs.
But assume there are no barriers
of trade between the two countries,
maybe due to a policy change and a
trade agreement, or simply because
people see the differences in efficiency
and realize there a mutually bene-
ficial gains to be made from trade.
Such a situation will necessarily lead
to specialization.
Dijob specializes in the produc-
tion of oil, producing 2 drums per
worker per day and the VL specializes
in the production of fish with an out-
put of 2 barrels per worker per day.
So overall output (the “world” out-
put in our model) increases for each
good. Now one drum of cooking oil
and one barrel of fish are produced
every single day per worker. A gain
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of one third of each good. If both
countries exchange goods one for one,
each worker can consumption more.
The concept of absolute advan-
tage makes sense, and it is very intu-
itive: A country should produce and
export the goods that it can produce
more efficiently and import the goods
that other countries are more efficient
in. Due to specialisation overall out-
put increases and everybody gains.
The theory implies that trade is ben-
eficial, and nobody loses out. But
there are some issues with this theory
which are highlighted below. Ques-
tion: can you think of one problem
with the concept? Worse, empirical
data make it hard to validate absolute
advantage as main driver of trade.
3.3 Comparative advan-
tage
You may ask “What happens if a
country has an absolute advantage in
producing everything?” Surely the re-
sult cannot be that the other country
produces nothing and all workers are
out of work.
David Ricardo, an English
economist, came up with an expla-
nation how trade could still happen
between countries although one of
them has an absolute advantage in
the production of every single good.
He formulated the theory of compar-
ative advantage.
Let’s go back to the example in-
volving my neighbour John. John
is a self-employed software developer,
producing software for large compa-
nies. For one hour of his work he bills
his clients £1,000. Recall that John
is twice as fast as I doing the dishes,
and only needs 30 minutes what takes
me an hour.
I, on the other hand, am an eco-
nomics student, with a modest hourly
wage of £10 earned by participating
in behavioural experiments that eco-
nomics professors run all the time.
Although John earns more per
hour and is better at doing the dishes
(note the absolute advantage!), it
would make sense for him to hire me
to do his dishes although I need twice
as much time.
The logic behind this intu-
itive insight is supported by what
economists call “opportunity cost”.
Opportunity cost is the cost I in-
cur by doing the dishes for an hour in-
stead of working at uni and earn £10.
John’s opportunity cost is £500 as he
loses half an hour time for program-
ming software. Therefore, there are
potential gains from trade. If John
pays me £20 to do his dishes we are
both better off. He earns an addi-
tional £450 and I am £10 better off.
The reason for this outcome is that
I have a comparative advantage in
cleaning the dishes although John has
an absolute advantage. Even though
my dishwashing skills and salary are
inferior to his, we are both better off
with trade rather than without it.
This simple example can be ap-
plied to world trade as before. Our
two countries are still the VL and Di-
job and they still only produce two
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goods. (Although the model can be
extended to many goods to make it
more realistic .) The two goods pro-
duced are still cooking oil and fish
with labour as the only input. But
the VL now has an absolute advan-
tage in both goods, it needs 4 hours
to produce 1 barrel of fish and 3
hours to produce one drum of oil.
Higher productivity in the VL could
be the result of better training that
made workers more efficient. In Dijob
things have not changed. A barrel of
fish still requires 8 hours of work and
producing 1 drum of oil is unchanged
at 4 hours of work. The new data are:
Country Fish Oil
VL 4 3
Dijob 8 4
Let us change our perspective a
bit and work out the potential output
per 8-hour work day in each country:
Country Fish Oil
VL 2 2.6
Dijob 1 2
If you like puzzles, look at the ta-
ble and try to work out who produces
how much of the two goods.
There are two ways to determine
where a country’s comparative ad-
vantage lies and, therefore, which
product it should produce.
First a country should produce
the good in which it has the least ab-
solute disadvantage if it has no abso-
lute advantage at all. Or, if it has an
absolute advantage in producing of
both goods, produce the good where
it has the greatest absolute advan-
tage.
The second way is more tricky. It
works via comparing relative prices:
the country should produce the good
which has a lower relative price. We
saw this reasoning in action in our
previous example. The relative price
for me to do the dishes was lower than
the relative price for John.
Dijob has no absolute advantage
but it is only 1.33 times as unpro-
ductive at producing oil compared to
2 times as unproductive at produc-
ing fish. Dijob has the least absolute
disadvantage in oil and should there-
fore specialise in its production. For
the VL the situation is reversed and
it should specialise in the production
of fish and import oil from Dijob.
Another way to come to this con-
clusion is to compare opportunity
costs. We have seen a country should
produce the good with the lowest op-
portunity cost. In the VL producing
one barrel of fish takes 4 hours. In
that amount of time 1.33 drums of
cooking oil can be produced. For the
VL the opportunity cost of one bar-
rel of fish is 1.33 drums of oil. And
producing one drum of oil results in
the opportunity cost of 0.75 barrels of
fish. For Dijob the opportunity cost
of producing one barrel of fish is 2
oil drums. In other words, producing
one drum of oil has the opportunity
cost of half a barrel of fish.
Since 0.75 is greater than 0.5, Di-
job can produce cooking oil “cheaper”
than the VL. Comparing the oppor-
tunity cost for fish shows that the VL
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has the lower opportunity cost (as 2
is greater than 1.33). As a result, the
VL should export fish and import oil.
The opposite holds true for Dijob.
Two issues arise. First, are the
countries better off with trade than
without (the autarky situation)? Sec-
ond, is the trade pattern predicted by
the concept of comparative advantage
realistic?
Indeed, we can quantify the effect
of trade and the role of comparative
advantage in our example. We can
also assert that the outcome is the
best possible one.
Unfortunately (for the economists!)
it does not happen very often that a
country goes from autarky to free
trade. But there is one famous ex-
ception. As we learned in Chapter 2,
Japan was almost completely isolated
from world trade until it was forced
to open up to trade in the middle of
the 19th century.
The emerging trade patterns in
Japan supported the assumptions of
comparative advantage. That is good
news for this concept. But did trade
make the Japanese people better off?
Yes, is the answer (luckily for trade
economists and the Japanese peo-
ple). It is estimated that the im-
proved terms of trade and adoption
of improved technology from abroad
resulted in as much as a 65% rise in
real national incomes.
The Ricardian model predicts a
high degree of specialisation. Actu-
ally, specialisation to a degree that
countries completely specialise in a
certain industry and abandon all
other industries completely. But this
is not something observed in the real
world for the majority of countries.
Despite these counter-factual im-
plication, the Ricardian model leads
to some interesting conclusions: A
country can benefit from trade al-
though the country has an absolute
disadvantage at producing any good;
comparative advantage depends on
the domestic wage rate and not only
on the productivity of an industry;
wage rate is determined by an abso-
lute advantage and thus it is an expla-
nation why “poor” countries export
(due to their lower wage rate).
Possibly the most important in-
sight is that low wage competition is
not harmful for the economy because
all that matters is that a country can
buy some products cheaper than it
would be if it produced these goods
itself. If that is the case, everyone
will benefit.
The Ricardian model can be mis-
leading in some respects. As we have
seen earlier, the greatest gains from
trade can be achieved through spe-
cialisation. The Ricardian model pre-
dicts specialisation to a degree that
countries completely specialise in cer-
tain industries and abandon all other
industries completely. But this is not
something observed in the real world
for the majority of countries.
For example, the car manufactur-
ing industry is divided between differ-
ent countries. According to Ricardo
that should not happen. There is a
straightforward reason for this flaw:
Ricardo neglects the other factors of
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production, capital and land. In other words, he simplified too much.
3.4 Specific factor model
The Ricardian model neglects other
factors of production such as capital
and land. As the reader will have
anticipated, there are more sophisti-
cated models where these factors are
considered. The specific sector model
incorporates labour, capital and land.
The model will give more accurate
predictions about trade patterns, and
it will help us to analyse who wins
and who loses from trade in the short
run. So, ultimately, whether a ratio-
nal person “fears” globalization and
free trade or welcomes it will depend
on your personal and professional cir-
cumstances.
A specific factor model is intro-
duced and analysed. As we know by
now, some assumptions will have to
be made. There are still only two
countries, the VL and Dijob, which
still produce only two goods, fish and
cooking oil but this time we assume
labour is not the only input. In ad-
dition to labour, land is used in the
production of cooking oil and capital
(say, fishing boats) in the production
of fish.
In other words, capital is “spe-
cific” to fish production and land is
“specific” to cooking oil production.
Specific thus means that we only need
labour and the specific factor to pro-
duce the good. Nothing else.
Labour can move between the in-
dustries of a country but not between
countries (at least for now but this
can be changed later). The other two
factors, land and machines, can not
move at all; these factors are specific
to the country and the industry.
How realistic are these simplifica-
tions used to construct our model?
Reality is that labour migration in
general is not as free as someone
might believe if she lives in the EU
which has free movement of labour.
Factories are not easily moved be-
tween countries. Access to the fishing
areas of other countries has to be ne-
gotiated. None of these factors of pro-
duction are quickly, cheaply and eas-
ily moved between countries or indus-
tries. Land cannot be moved at all.
Obviously other factors are not com-
pletely immobile, but they are in the
short run. In the long run factories
can be repurposed, newly build, fish-
ing rights can be changed, and land
leased.
We now turn to the analysis of the
model.
Labour mobility implies that
wages have to be the same in both
industries. Otherwise the “mobile”
workers move to the industry that of-
fers better pay. To attract workers,
the industry with lower pay has to
raise wages up to the point where it
matches that of the other sector in
the economy. When wages are equal,
workers see no point in moving be-
tween the two industries. How many
of the workers are in a particular in-
dustry depends.
It depends on the amount of land
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and capital available. There is lit-
tle point in putting more fishermen
on board a vessel beyond the normal
crew count as it will not increase the
catch. The same holds true in a pizza
restaurant.
Imagine a pizza restaurant with
two pizza ovens. One chef needs 1
hour to make 20 pizze (the Italian
plural of pizza). Now, the restaurant
hires an additional chef. Both chefs
together make 40 pizze per hour.
Following this positive outcome, the
restaurant decides to hire another 10
chefs in the believe that all 12 chefs
together make in total 72 pizze per
hour. However, with just 2 ovens
this is simply not feasible. Hence,
each additional chef will add fewer
and fewer pizze to the total output.
In economics this principle is called
diminishing returns to scale. Increas-
ing inputs lead to a slower and slower
increase in output. The restaurant
would have to increase the number
of ovens to make the best use of the
labour hired.
The comparative advantage is just
as before. The potential output per
8-hour workday in each country is:
Country Fish Oil
VL 2 2.6
Dijob 1 2
In order for trade to take place,
opportunity costs have to differ be-
tween countries. As we have seen be-
fore, the opportunity cost of produc-
ing one barrel of fish in the VL is 1.33
drums of oil. Thus, we say the rela-
tive price of one barrel of fish is 1.33.
The relative price of oil is the inverse
of the relative oil price. Hence, the
relative price of cooking oil in the VL
is 0.75. In Dijob the relative price
for oil is one half and for fish it is
2. Therefore, we conclude that cook-
ing oil is cheaper in Dijob and fish is
cheaper in the VL.
Without any trade, consumers
in both countries can only consume
what they produce. Luckily for
the consumers, the countries’ govern-
ments sign a free trade agreement.
As a result of the free trade agree-
ment, both countries start trading
and prices will change. In fact, both
relative prices have to become equal.
Otherwise it would pay to ship more
goods between the two countries.
The relative price of cooking oil
can go up because oil gets more ex-
pensive. Or because fish gets cheaper.
Or both. Or because oil and fish both
get more expensive but oil more so.
Or both get cheaper but fish more so.
The only sure prediction is that
with trade the relative price is some-
where between 0.5 (Dijob’s pre-trade
one) and 0.75 (the VL’s pre-trade
one).
When trading is possible, the VL
will export fish and Dijob oil - that
would be the case in the Ricardian
model. But not in the specific sec-
tor model due to diminishing returns
to scale. Firms would specialise but
they will keep some production ca-
pacity of both goods. We are mov-
ing away from a given output ta-
ble and are focusing more on relative
prices. Furthermore, the specific sec-
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tor model is a short-run model there-
fore capital as well as land is fixed
and we cannot add any of these two
goods. Factories facing diminishing
returns to scale and no way to in-
crease their capital therefore output
is constrained by the available capital
and as a result there will never be a
case where production is zero for any
factor.
Given the new world market
prices, Dijob workers will say that
oil has become relatively more expen-
sive, while the VL workers will find
that fish is now relatively more ex-
pensive.
Suppose the relative world market
price is 0.6. Then a drum of cooking
oil will cost the same as 0.6 barrels of
fish. The value of goods produced in
Dijob is 60% of those produced in the
VL.
The new trade pattern and the re-
sulting change in output in the VL
and Dijob has distributional conse-
quences for landowners, capital own-
ers and workers.
Let’s start by analysing the con-
sequences for capital owners in Dijob.
Fish is no longer produced in Dijob.
There is no longer any demand for
your capital. Your income falls and
you will no longer be able to buy as
much as you used to do.
If you are a landowner, you profit
from the newly emerged trade pat-
terns. The price for oil in Dijob rises
and as a result your land becomes
more valuable as it is needed for pro-
duction of grain or sun flowers that
are processed to oil. A land owner’s
real income will rise and she will be
able to buy more of both goods.
There is an important lesson here.
An increase in the relative price of
a good will increase the real income
earned by the factor specific to that
industry. But it will decrease the
real income of factors specific to the
other industry. In Dijob the real in-
come earned by land owners increases
whereas the real income earned by
the capital owners decreases.
More important however is what
happens to labour. Their overall
wage increases. But they are fac-
ing higher prices for oil but lower
prices for fish. Hence if a worker likes
to consume more oil than fish, he is
likely to be worse off. A worker who
likes to consume more fish is better
off with international trade.
In conclusion it depends on your
consumption pattern whether you
benefit from international trade.
3.5 Gains/cost of trade
Trade between countries is not sure to
be a good thing for everyone. There
are negative effects on the income dis-
tribution. If you own immobile fac-
tors of production in an industry that
faces new competition, you are worse
off with international trade. If you
prefer to consume goods whose prices
rise due to higher demand from for-
eign countries, you can be worse off as
well. If your wage increases enough,
however, you will be better off.
The model says that labour can
move from one industry to another
without any barriers. But this is of-
ten not so in the real world. Low
skilled workers can often find it diffi-
cult to make the transition from one
industry into the other. Low skilled
workers are therefore more likely to
lose from international trade.
Despite the negative effects men-
tioned, the economy as whole is still
better off with trade. If (a big “if”) it
would be possible to effectively dis-
tribute the additional goods gained
from trade among the “losers from in-
ternational trade”, everybody can be
made better off. Even those people
that initially lost.
3.6 Heckscher-Ohlin
In the Ricardian model and in the
specific sector model it was assumed
that one country can produce some-
thing better mostly as a result of
technological difference in countries.
However, most countries in the devel-
oped world have very similar techno-
logical levels.
Spain is the world’s biggest ex-
porter of oranges. France the world’s
biggest importer. Both countries
have access to the same technol-
ogy for growing oranges. But Spain
has more favourable weather to pro-
duce oranges. Countries are naturally
differently endowed with certain re-
sources. Spain also has more arable
land that is better suited for the cul-
tivation of oranges than has France.
As we have observed from this ex-
ample, on the one hand, both coun-
tries have the technology to produce
the required goods. On the other
hand, each country possesses differ-
ent resources that make it easier to
produce some goods.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model deals
with this situation. It allows coun-
tries with the same level of tech-
nological knowledge to trade with
each other based on their resources.
Therefore, it offers an explanation
why Germany trades with the UK
and not only with less developed
countries.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model also
offers an explanation why we do
not observe the extreme levels of
specialisation predicted by Ricardo’s
model. But the main feature of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model is that it can
predict the outcome of trade much
more accurate than the specific sec-
tor model as it looks at the long run.
Like always, the model needs as-
sumptions to work. There are only
two countries, the VL and Dijob, they
produce two goods, fish and cooking
oil. The difference to the specific fac-
tor model is that for the production of
the two goods only labour and capi-
tal is required, a completely immobile
factor (such as land) no longer plays
a role.
Imagine a world like ours today.
In addition to labour, machines are
the most expensive input to produc-
tion. Arable land is cheap and plen-
tiful in comparison. Growing grain
or sun flowers for cooking oil requires
harvesters and production plant to
press the seeds and extract the oil.
Fishing is capital intense with expen-
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sive trawlers or fish factory vessels.
All of these fall under the category
“capital”.
Capital and labour in the
Heckscher-Ohlin model can move be-
tween the two different industry sec-
tors but not between countries. An-
other assumption is that the VL and
Dijob differ in their endowment of
capital and labour.
Not only do both countries dif-
fer but both goods differ as well, one
good, in our case fish, is capital-
intensive to produce which means it
needs more capital per labour and the
other good, oil, is more labour inten-
sive, it needs more labour per ma-
chine.
One country, in our example Di-
job, is labour-abundant, which means
it has more labour relative to capital
than the other country. The VL is
capital-abundant which means it has
more capital relative to labour. It is
important to understand that abun-
dancies of a factor are always in rel-
ative terms. In absolute terms Di-
job can have more capital and labour
than the VL. But it would still be
labour-abundant if it has a higher
worker to capital ratio then the VL.
Being the labour-abundant coun-
try, Dijob can produce more cooking
oil than the VL but less fish. There-
fore, the relative price for oil is lower
in Dijob than in the VL. In the VL
the relative price of fish is lower than
in Dijob as the VL can produce more
fish than Dijob due to its capital-
abundancy, but less cooking oil.
Under autarky both countries
could only consume what they pro-
duce and can not take advantage of
the cheaper goods available abroad.
Once again, the governments of both
countries realise this and open up to
trade. Goods can be traded without
any barriers between both countries.
Applying the same mechanism as
in the specific-factor model, prices
will converge to become the same (ex-
cept for transport cost). Due to a
price increase in fish from the VL’s
perspective, it will start exporting
fish and Dijob will start exporting
oil. This is known as the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem, which says in much
generality: A country will export the
good whose factor it has in abun-
dance and import the good whose fac-
tor is scarce.
One important aspect of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model is that, com-
pared to the other models reviewed
so far, there is no complete spe-
cialisation. This is due to a phe-
nomenon called increasing opportu-
nity cost. This concept can be a bit
confusing at first. But it becomes
fairly obvious once studied detail. It
is a more realistic assumption than
the constant opportunity costs that
were assumed so far.
The VL is relatively capital-
abundant: it has relatively more cap-
ital than labour. If the VL wants
to increase the production of fish, it
will need more capital or labour to
do so. We only have two sectors, the
fish producing sector and the cook-
ing oil producing sector. In order to
increase fish production, the fish pro-
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ducing sector needs to poach factors
of production from the oil producing
sector.
The cooking oil producing sector
relies more on labour than on capital.
Hence, it will first let some capital go.
The newly acquired capital, which is
relatively important for the fish pro-
duction, will increase the output of
the fish industry by a lot whereas the
oil production will only contract a lit-
tle as a result of its stronger reliance
on labour.
But the more the VL wants to in-
crease its fish production, the more
capital has to flow from the oil sec-
tor to the fish sector. At some point
the fish sector also needs to employ
labour from the oil sector. Since
labour is much more important for
oil production, its production will de-
cline more strongly than the gain in
fishing. Therefore, the opportunity
cost of producing fish increases the
more fish is produced. Consequently,
at some point the opportunity cost
to produce one more barrel of fish is
greater than the world market price.
Then production will no longer ex-
pand, resulting in incomplete special-
ization. The cooking oil sector sur-
vives though at a small scale.
3.7 International trade
and its consequences
The Heckscher-Ohlin model has much
more potential. And myriad of
economists have expanded the model,
formulated new results and further
improved the understanding the im-
pact of trade.
The first theorem was developed
by Tadeusz Rybczynski. It states
that, with constant prices, an in-
crease in one of the two factors re-
sults in an increase in the produc-
tion of the good that uses this factor
relatively intensively. Output of the
other product decreases. This is im-
portant as it says that if the available
amount of labour increases in Dijob,
the amount of cooking oil produced
increases and the amount of fish pro-
duced decreases.
Another important result was ob-
tained by Paul Samuelson and Wolf-
gang Stolper. It touches the sensible
subject of how wages change in re-
sponse to changes in the relative price
of goods through trade. To sum-
marise, free trade results in an in-
crease in the price of the good that
uses the abundant factor intensively
in its production and a decrease in the
price of the product uses the scarce
factor in its production.
Real earnings will increase with a
relative price increase (and decreases
with a relative price decrease), in or-
der to keep employed the scarce fac-
tor whether it be labour, or capital
must take cuts in compensation, in
the case of capital the return on in-
vestment decreases, for labour wages
fall or for land rent decreases. As a re-
sult, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
might be used as an argument to op-
pose free trade, but it is important
to keep in mind that the society as
a whole gains more from trade than
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certain groups lose.
Finally, the one of the most
controversial findings is called Fac-
tor price equalization theorem un-
der this theorem free trade leads to
equalization of factor prices (in the
Heckscher-Ohlin model this is capi-
tal and labour). So initially labour is
cheap in the labour abundant coun-
try and capital is cheaper in the capi-
tal abundant country. Trade will lead
to convergence of prices so that the
price for labour, which is the wage
paid to employees in both countries
is the same.
This would imply that compe-
tition with low wage countries de-
creases the wage in high-wage coun-
tries. However, for this result to hold
all assumptions of the Heckscher-
Ohlin model have to hold perfectly.
But as we know, this is very unlikely.
Nonetheless Dan Ben-David
demonstrated that there was a con-
vergence of income in Western Eu-
rope after the European Union was
formed. It is important to keep in
mind that most countries have been
developed countries and that had
roughly the similar technology avail-
able. More recent studies about con-
vergence, do not show such a clear
convergence between countries.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model is a
useful tool to analyse trade and the
impact of trade. In comparison to
the specific factor model it predicts
the winners and losers much more
clearly. Winners are those possess-
ing the abundant factor and losers are
those possessing the scarce factor in
a country. As a result, worker in the
export industry, which is the abun-
dant industry should favour free trade
and workers in the import industry
should oppose it. Later in the book
we will focus more on this hypothesis
and other explanations what explains
opinions on free trade. There is em-
pirical evidence that workers are ei-
ther favouring or opposing free trade
according to their long run earning
potential.
In 1953 the economist Wassily
Leontief applied the Heckscher-Ohlin
model to the U.S. He used data
on capital and labour for the year
1947. He estimated that the U.S.
was capital-abundant compared to
the rest of the world. Therefore it
should export capital-intensive goods
and import labour-intensive goods.
However, the data actually showed
that the U.S. was exporting labour-
intensive goods and imported capital-
intensive goods.
This was known as Leontief’s
paradox.
What was missing was the dis-
tinction between skilled and unskilled
labour. The U.S. was actually a ex-
porter in labour-intensive goods pro-
duced by skilled labour as well of agri-
cultural products which are labour
abundant and land abundant.
3.8 New trade theory
All trade models so far predicted a
high degree of specialisation in all
sectors whose goods are exported.
Countries would not trade the same
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good with each other. Yet we ob-
serve exactly such a pattern in the
real world. Germany exports cars to
Japan and imports cars from Japan.
Although prices differ there is no spe-
cialisation which would result in ei-
ther Germany or Japan being the sole
exporter of cars. A puzzle.
It was solved by new trade the-
ory. The word new might be a bit
misleading. The theory was devel-
oped mostly in the 1980s, almost 40
years ago. Back then it was new and
breath taking. For the first time a
model said products can be differen-
tiated and thus explain why countries
not only trade with each other but
why there is so much intra-industry
trade happening.
Intra-industry trade refers to the
practice that countries trade with
each other in the same industry, for
example cars. This is especially
important for developed countries.
Most of the worldwide trade is be-
tween developed countries and most
of this trade is intra industry-trade.
In all the models up to now the
two goods did not differ in quality
or type. Every drum of cooking oil
was identical, and every barrel of fish
the same as the other. Now pro-
ducers can differentiate their prod-
ucts. Cooking oil might be organic
and come in different qualities. The
same for fish, farmed or caught in the
high seas. Producers gain the power
to influence the price they can charge
their customers.
Previously we always assumed the
price of a good is equal to its relative
cost. With differentiated products,
superior products can come with a
higher price tag than a similar but
lower-quality item.
There are a few additional as-
sumptions need to make the model
work.
Although producers can differ-
entiate their products, they cannot
change any price because there are
many other firms competing. This
assumption is fairly realistic. Think
of Kellogg’s, one of the most famous
brands in the cereal business. Due to
their strong brand, they can charge
higher prices than other producers.
Kellogg’s differentiated their product.
However, they cannot increase their
price indefinitely. At some point con-
sumers would switch to cereals from
other brands.
Another assumption is that with
higher output, the average cost per
good produced falls. If a machine or
a factory needs to be installed, then
with more units produced, this fixed
cost can be spread and thus the cost
per unit produced fall s. Economist
use the term increasing returns to
scale to describe such a feature. Let
us illustrate this with the help of an
example. Imagine you own a factory
that produces chairs. Your first cus-
tomer orders a chair, in order to pro-
duce that chair you have to come up
with the design, source the materi-
als and ge the required tools, which
are fixed costs. The next time a
customer orders a chair, you already
have a blueprint and you know where
to get the required materials and you
39
already have the required toosl for
production, hence your only effort for
this order is to produce the chair. As
can be easily seen the effort you put
in the second order is much less and
hence you have to spend less time and
money on producing it. Your costs
fall with increased production, hence
increasing returns to scale.
As with all models before we have
two countries, the VL and Dijob,
which produce two goods, fish and
cooking oil. This time we are as-
suming that both countries are com-
pletely identical, this means accord-
ing to our previous models they do
not have any reason to trade. Before
the governments allow international
trade, each firm has only its home
market to sell its products. There-
fore, firms can not fully take advan-
tage of economies of scale. Con-
sumers choice is limited by the num-
ber of firms within a country.
If the governments decide to re-
move all barriers to trade and allow
the free flow of goods across its bor-
ders, companies will start exporting
and competing with companies from
the other country. Producers will
try to expand their market share and
to take advantage of increasing re-
turns to scale. Consumers now face
increased variety of goods to choose
from which means their demand be-
comes more sensitive to prices of the
goods. Elastic in economic terms.
In our example, consumers have
now a wider variety of different cook-
ing oils to buy. In order to grow their
market share, producers have to lower
their price. This will result in more
sales. Although cooking oil can be
differentiated, consumers can substi-
tute between these. (At least to a cer-
tain extent.) So if one company lower
price, others will have to follow. Oth-
erwise, they lose market share and
cannot profit from increasing returns
to scale.
Some companies may have to
close down. If a producer is much less
efficient than its competitors (maybe
due to poor management or insuf-
ficient investment in the past), it
makes losses on each unit produced if
the market price is low. Competitors
will take its share of the market.
Even with fewer companies, con-
sumers can have an increased variety
at lower prices compared to no trade
because they can now shop on the
world market.
The model leads to some interest-
ing conclusions. Trade continues to
generate winners and losers. Espe-
cially in the short run, there are can
be immense adjustment cost. One is
loss of wages as workers are laid off
because unproductive firms go out of
business. In the long run those costs
are offset because factors of produc-
tion can move freely and can adjust.
People who become unemployed ini-
tially can find new jobs. Capital can
be used somewhere more productive.
Is this only theory or is there
empirical evidence to back up these
claims?
Daniel Trefler analysed the ef-
fects of opening trade between the
U.S. and Canada through CUFTA
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and later through NAFTA. He found
that overall productivity increased.
He also noted that sectors that were
protected suffered from lower com-
petitiveness and, as a result, suf-
fered the most from opening to trade.
However, competitive firms’ output
soared, and they employed more peo-
ple to satisfy the increased demand
for their goods.
Further studies found that the in-
crease in the variety of goods resulted
in substantial savings for consumers
making them better off than before.
In the long run the gains from
trade seem to outweigh the cost. Al-
though it is important to keep in
mind that an economy consists of
many different individuals and not all
of them gain from trade.
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4 Trade & Everything Else
We now know why people trade
and what economic models have to
say about trade and its effects. We
also learned that views about trade
can differ starkly, depending on your
circumstances and education. The in-
nate fear of free trade seems almost
as strong as the innate propensity to
barter.
Many seem to believe that trade
is a zero-sum game: ‘We’ win what
‘they’ lose; therefore trade must be
responsible for growing poverty and
inequality worldwide. Many climate
activists fear that trade is one of main
culprits of climate change and species
extinction.
Workers in developed countries
fear “unfair” competition from low
wage countries that destroy their
jobs. “Back then everything was bet-
ter, less trade, less competition and
more job security” can be heard in
discussions, talk shows and political
events alike. Even white-collar work-
ers are becoming more critical of free
trade.
Outsourcing services to low-wage
countries such as India, threatens the
jobs of workers with university de-
grees. Politicians promise different
trade policies to win votes. The 2016
American election was also fought
over the issue whether the U.S. lost
to its international competitors and
whether tariff protection can “make
America great again”.
Trade seems to be blamed for al-
most every social issue on this planet.
However, many anti-trade actionists
forget that trade is about the ex-
change of goods and not about free-
ing capital flows, unfettered capital-
ism or, as Bhagwati put it beauti-
fully, “for free whatever”. Being crit-
ical about the globalization does not
necessarily imply being critical about
trade, trade is only one part of glob-
alization.
This chapter covers many social
issues where trade is deemed to be
responsible for their occurrence and
seeks to clarify to what extent trade
can really be blamed.
4.1 Low wage competi-
tion
One of the basic arguments for pro-
tection goes as follows: Low-wage
countries steal our jobs. To complete,
we need to lower our wages; there-
fore, we need protection. The logic
behind that argument seems persua-
sive. Due to the increased competi-
tion from low-wage countries, work-
ers in developed countries must ac-
cept cuts in wages to prevent compa-
nies from leaving. Or because other
countries offer lower wages, compa-
nies move their production abroad
and the jobs are lost. Either way, for-
eign competition is to be blamed.
Another popular argument is
based on the lower labour standards
that many low-wage countries have.
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It is often seen as an “unfair” ad-
vantage for developing countries that
leads to the loss of “honest” and
“hard working” jobs.
All arguments intuitively make
sense. There so many anecdotal sto-
ries about how people lost their job
to trade. For example, I (Levi) had a
summer job in a factory in Germany
that was slowly moving production to
Poland. The lower wages paid there
were surely one of the main reasons
to move production abroad. Many
people in that factory feared to be
laid off, and it was the competition
of low wage countries that led to the
destruction of their jobs.
However, there was one interest-
ing anomaly, most people did not
complaint about trade. This is
strange because trade seems to be
the obvious reason why jobs got re-
located. Free trade makes is possible
that parts can be produced in Poland
and then shipped back to Germany to
be assembled here. If there were high
tariffs between Germany and Poland,
those job would have not been moved
to Poland.
Most of my co-workers seemed to
know that it was trade that led to
their jobs in the first place. Our prod-
ucts were shipped to customers all
over the world, and the jobs that were
outsourced to Poland were mostly
of unskilled nature. While I was
there, the company even extended
their plant due to increased special-
isation. For me that was of course
bad news, I knew that in the near
future they would no longer hire stu-
dents because all the work would need
specially trained workers.
This anecdote illustrates beauti-
fully both sides of the story of trade.
Trade leads not to the destruction
or creation of jobs – a common mis-
conception about trade. But trade
leads to a redistribution of jobs. Ev-
ery student of economics knows that
employment depends on macroeco-
nomics factors. In the short run,
aggregate demand determines unem-
ployment and, in the long run, the
natural rate of unemployment is the
driving force behind the employment
rate. Microeconomic policy tools
such as , tariffs, quotas etc have little
net effects on the number of jobs in
an economy.
4.2 Efficiency gains
What trade does, however, is redis-
tributing jobs away from inefficient
industries to more efficient industries.
Trade leads to an increase in com-
petition. Formerly sheltered compa-
nies now face competition from for-
eign firms who also want to sell their
products.
This is generally good news for
consumers. Falling prices due to in-
creased competition and more choice
of products. For firms competing
with these imports, increased compe-
tition is bad news. Market share de-
clines and profit margins shrink. Ei-
ther firms innovate and become more
efficient or they go out of business and
make space for more efficient firms.
This sounds appealing in theory.
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Luckily there is evidence supporting
this hypothesis. Daniel Trefler ex-
amined the effect of the Canadian-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
and found compelling evidence that
trade led to increased productivity in
the long-run. This is good news for
consumers and efficient producers.
However, the paper uncovered an-
other important aspect of trade. And
these findings are bad news for work-
ers and inefficient producers that
have to close down and have to lay off
workers. As a result of the Canada-
U.S. trade agreement, employment in
manufacturing fell by 5%. In indus-
tries that relied the most on protec-
tion, employment dropped by 12%.
However, within 10 years the lost
jobs have been made up by employ-
ment gains in other sectors of the
economy. Trefler further argues that
the FTA most likely led to an overall
welfare improvement.
4.3 Productivity & wages
Nevertheless, it is hard to argue
for trade when considering individual
hardship. We know that overall gains
from trade could be redistributed to
make everyone else better off. But
that it is almost impossible to do in
practice. Arguing that trade is good
for a nation and its people only look-
ing at aggregate gains is problematic;
it does neglect the hardship faced by
many workers that are displaced.
Another study shows that Mex-
ican firms increased in productivity
as well as a result of NAFTA, espe-
cially firms in the exporting sector
increased productivity by 45% from
1994 – 2003.
There is another reason why pro-
ductivity gains are important. Eco-
nomic theory predicts that if pro-
ductivity increases, wages increase as
well. This is important to keep in
mind. Often foes of trade argue that
developing countries will pair their
low wages with increasing productiv-
ity and consequently reduce our liv-
ing standards.
This assumption, as so many that
are presented in order to discredit
trade, are very compelling. They
seem to make sense and paint a clear
picture of good and evil. The only
problem is that empirical evidence
says otherwise.
The Nobel prize laureate Paul
Krugman stated: “Economic history
offers no example of a country that
experienced long-term productivity
growth without a roughly equal rise
in wages”.
This can be best illustrated by
looking at China. China’s produc-
tivity is growing continuously. Its
growth rate averages 7.41% between
1953 and 2018. At the same time,
China’s wages are growing rapidly as
well. On average 8.2% between 2008
and 2017.
A result of this trend is that, for
example, production in the apparel
and footwear industry is moving from
China to countries such as Vietnam
and Cambodia that pay lower wages.
This spiral of increasing produc-
tivity and wages is nothing extraor-
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dinary. It was the same for South
Korea. In the 1980s Nike produced
about two-thirds of its footwear in
South Korea. As productivity rose in
South Korea and with it the wages,
Nike moved its production to other,
lower wage countries.
4.4 Wage stagnation
However, in recent years wage growth
has stagnated or has grown very mod-
erately. Surely it should be possi-
ble to blame trade for that. We
already know from the trade model
discussed in an earlier chapter that
some people lose out on trade; and
that Daniel Trefler’s survey showed
that industries that rely on protec-
tion were obliterated. Dani Rodrik
correctly points out that trade is bad
news for workers that are not very
mobile, have little education and are
have low skills.
Income inequality rose especially
in respect to education. Often wages
for workers with a university degree
increased, while wages for workers
without any higher education fell. Iin
the U.S., wages for workers without
a university degree fell by 20% be-
tween the 1970s and 1990s while pro-
ductivity soared. However, research
suggests that trade is not the main
foe of working-class people. But that
technological change is.
Technological change is one of the
main reasons for current labour lay-
offs. Most importantly it is mostly
technological progress that depresses
the wages of low-skilled workers and
increases the income inequality be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers.
Technological progress reduced the
demand for low-skilled labour, and
reduced demand means reduced com-
pensation in form of wages for work-
ers.
Besides technological advances,
another important aspect changed
the demand for labour in manufac-
turing: consumption patterns in most
developed countries. People started
spending more money on services
than on goods. As a result, less
labour is required to produce goods
and more is needed to provide these
services.
If competition forces a company
to either decrease wages or cut em-
ployment and modernise, the com-
pany is more likely to cut employ-
ment. There is a simple but persua-
sive logic behind that argument. If
the company would cut their wages,
the most productive worker would
leave, and the company would be left
with unproductive workers that can-
not find a job anywhere else.
By cutting the workforce and re-
placing the unproductive workers by
machines, the company is becoming
more productive. So job losses rather
than a race to the bottom when it
comes to wages is more likely.
4.5 Superstars
Last but not least the superstar ef-
fect and technology. In 1981 Sherwin
Rose, an economist from the Univer-
sity of Chicago, published an influ-
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ential paper entitled “The Economics
of Superstars”. He argued that there
are a few, especially gifted people
who, thanks to technology, are now
able to realize much larger gains from
their skills than ever before.
Take for example Leonardo Di-
Caprio, a famous actor. Now imag-
ine he lived before the invention of
television. No matter how famous
he would have been in those days,
he could never have reached the hun-
dreds of millions of people he does to-
day. All with the help of television,
cinema and streaming.
4.6 Inequality
Trade is not the main culprit be-
hind increasing inequality. In-
crease in income inequality can be
explained largely by technological
changes. Why wealth inequality in-
creases is still a hotly debated topic
in the economics profession.
Turning away from technology to
the jobs trade “destroys”. People
that are displaced due to trade are in
general less educated, have a longer
tenure and belong more often to a
minority group than workers that are
displaced in non-manufacturing sec-
tors.
Although the same characteristics
hold true for most displaced manu-
facturing workers, workers being dis-
placed by trade are more likely to
be female. Additionally, most manu-
facturing workers that lose their jobs
to imports suffer from earning loses
once they find new jobs. The longer
their previous employment lasted, the
greater the drop in their earnings.
And although many are able to find
a job in the same industry, they
rarely find jobs in the export indus-
try. These workers are vulnerable
to continuous displacement due to
trade.
After reading the previous para-
graphs, it could be argued that pro-
tection is good and necessary because
it saves the jobs of these workers that
are already having a more difficult
time; both in terms of wage pres-
sure and the difficulty in find new
jobs. But exactly there lies the prob-
lem, it is not trade that is responsi-
ble for these bleak statistics. Being
less educated, belonging to a minor-
ity group and being female already
makes it harder on the employment
market, trade cannot and does not
change these underlying causes.
As Jagdish Bhagwati said “you
cannot kill two birds with one stone”.
Jobs being displaced by trade and do-
mestic problems, such as the disad-
vantage in the job markets for minori-
ties, less educated people and women
discussed above, are two completely
different problems. Therefore, they
require two different sets of policy in-
terventions. Trade cannot solve all
problems in the same way that a sin-
gle stone cannot kill two birds.
4.7 Cost of saving jobs
For a moment let us assume that
the government decides to protect a
certain industry with the prospect
47
of saving jobs. U.S. president Don-
ald Trump recently imposed tariffs on
steel and washing machines, to cite
but two examples. Although it is cor-
rect that jobs were saved in both in-
dustries and new jobs were created,
the cost of these jobs is enormous.
For every additional job created in
the steel industry through protection,
steel users will pay an extra $650,000
due to increased prices. Trump’s
Tariff on Washing Machines was an
equally bad deal for consumers, cost-
ing consumers roughly $820,000 per
job created.
There are countless more exam-
ples, past and present, that jobs saved
and created through protection are
expensive for consumers. For exam-
ple, a study in 1994 found that pro-
tectionism cost the American con-
sumer $170,000 on average per saved
job. Therefore, it is not a new obser-
vation that jobs saved by protection
are expensive affairs.
4.8 Labour conditions
Jobs saved by protectionism might
be expensive but what if those jobs
are saved because protection is put
in place to prevent “unfair” competi-
tion from developing countries due to
horrendous labour conditions?
In 2012 a fire at one of the many
Bangladesh garment factories killed
over 100 people, due to lack of safety
standards. After events like this,
there is often a call for trade sanctions
on grounds of low labour standards
abroad. Low wages is then thrown in
as an additional argument. But most
of the differences in wages between
developing and developed countries
can be explained by differences in
productivity. Workers are much less
productive. Although average wages
are lower in these countries, most for-
eign firms pay substantially higher
wages than their competitors.
There is little evidence to sup-
port the claim that trade erodes
labour standards globally. Quite
to the contrary. Studies often find
that trade increases labour standards
worldwide. Although sweatshops are
far from perfect and the conditions
are often far below those in developed
countries, they only exist due to a
lack of other employment forms. Ef-
forts to stop imports from sweatshops
therefore can destroy the livelihood of
many people who depend on this job.
4.9 Child labour
Another issue that is often raised
when talking about sweatshops is the
issue of child labour. Current ILO
estimates suggest that over 150 mil-
lion children are in labour and of
those over 50% are working under
hazardous conditions. These num-
bers are horrifying, and virtually ev-
eryone would argue that this problem
needs to be addressed. But would im-
posing a ban on child labour products
really help?
In 1992 the American Senator
Tom Harkin first proposed the so-
called “U.S. Child Labor Deterrence
Act”. It would have banned all im-
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ports from textiles using child labour.
In response to this bill, approxi-
mately 50,000 children lost their job
in Bangladesh. To assume that hese
children would now be free to attend
school is naive. The bill drove chil-
dren into worse jobs and sometimes
even prostitution.
Banning child labour does not
seem to solve the problem. On the
contrary, trade seems to have a posi-
tive impact on fighting child labour.
The main reason for child labour
is not trade but poverty. In order
to eradicate child labour, we have to
eradicate poverty. Most developed
countries had child labour in the past.
In England children were working in
the mines until the mid-19th century.
The argument that current trade and
outsourcing is the reason for child
labour is misleading.
A study using data from Vietnam
tells an interesting story. During the
period 1993 – 1998 the price of rice in-
creased by 29% on average. Partially
due to the relaxation of the rice ex-
port quota. As a result, parents who
experienced an increase in their in-
come could afford sending their chil-
dren to school.
Another reason why child labour
occurs is that parents are restricted in
their ability to make up for the lost
income when sending their children
to school. They are poor, therefore
need the money the children bring
home. If parents could borrow money
to send their children to school, they
might. But poor families often have
no access to credit. A study of poor
families in Tanzania supports this
view.
Fighting child labour means fight-
ing poverty. Neither of both can be
achieved with protection.
4.10 Downstream
George Santayana proclaimed:
“Those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it.”
When it comes to trade and protec-
tion, the cost to consumers is often
forgotten.
Besides the high cost to con-
sumers, protection can destroy jobs in
other parts of the industry. The steel
industry, which produces important
intermediate goods for many prod-
ucts, is a particular striking example.
Trump’s tariff on steel, while it
does protect jobs in the steel indus-
try, jeopardizes jobs in industries that
use steel (“downstream industries”
in economic jargon). Rising prices
for steel could make the products of
steel-users too expensive to be com-
petitive on the world market. Jobs
in these industries outnumber jobs in
the steel industry by 80 to 1.
U.S. sugar protection entails
sugar prices that are two times higher
than world market prices. A good
reason for food-processing industries
that use sugar, to move across U.S.
borders.
Removing the protection of the
sugar industry is estimated to create
between 17,000 and 20,000 new jobs
in the food processing sector. These
new jobs come at the expense of a
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drop of employment of 4.2% in the
sugar sector. A net gain of more than
15,000 jobs.
History is littered with trade re-
strictions that harmed downstream
industries. Duties on LCD panels.
Price floors on Japanese DRAM semi-
conductor production. U.S. down-
stream producers went abroad in or-
der to take advantage of lower world
market prices.
4.11 Unemployment
Unemployment has detrimental ef-
fects on psychological as well as phys-
ical health. And it increases the in-
cidence of suicide. Unemployment
lowers life satisfaction more than any
other single characteristic such as di-
vorce.
Although we have established
that domestic policy changes are
needed to ensure a well-functioning
job market, protection can save jobs.
Telling unemployed people that their
unemployment is for the greater good
because the economy as a whole is
better off, will not go down well. Be-
side lowering the living standard, be-
ing unemployed also affects the chil-
dren and partner.
A recent study found that hav-
ing unemployed parents decreases life
satisfaction of children in their later
life. Furthermore, unemployment is
linked to a decline in children’s hap-
piness, which can be directly linked
to poorer school achievements and a
higher probability of child neglect.
Children of parents with low ed-
ucation are particularly hard hit.
Their parents are more likely to be
displaced by trade and having parents
with low education already puts you
at a disadvantage.
The cost-benefit analysis of trade
could very well be reversed. More re-
search is needed to find efficient ways
how distribute the gains from trade
so that current “losers” stop being
losers.
4.12 Households
While protection imposes a high cost
on consumers, on the household level
the cost often is negligible. Take
the sugar protection. Estimates say
that liberalizing the sugar protec-
tion would increase consumer wel-
fare by $342.7 million. Clearly a lot
of money. Nevertheless, the average
household in the U.S. forgoes approx-
imately $2.88 in welfare gains from
sugar protection. Per year. This
number increases to $27.80 per year
if one could buy sugar at the lower
world market prices.
Is a saving of this magnitude
really substantial enough to justify
the disastrous blow dealt to existing
workers and their families?
Weighing the pros and cons of
trade and its myriad direct and in-
direct effects in more detail would
fill a book. Just as a final remark
consider that trade protection often
favours industries of the past and
that free trade moves the economy to-
wards new and more efficient indus-
tries. Transitions, although painful,
50
are often necessary to allow a coun-
try to move towards a better future.
4.13 Climate change
Moving away from trade and jobs
to something everybody should worry
about: climate change. Even if you
believe your job will never be affected
by trade or if your job depends on
exporting and therefore you are in
favour of free trade.
One of the biggest fears of many
climate activists is that of a different
race to the bottom: production mov-
ing to countries that have much less
stringent environmental regulations.
Pollution havens in other words. To
compete, countries will have to lower
its environmental regulations. The
race to the bottom.
As compelling as this sounds,
there is not much evidence support-
ing the claim that “dirty” industries
move to countries with laxer envi-
ronmental standards. Environmental
standards are a cost factor but, com-
pared to lower wages, the pull-factor
of low environmental standards seems
almost negligible.
Demands for high environmental
standards are often disguised demand
for protection by industries or inter-
est groups that see their product lose
market shares to increased competi-
tion from developing countries. In-
deed, unions and NGOs in less de-
veloped countries are often opposed
to include such propositions in trade
agreements
The next section deals more
closely with the issue of special inter-
est groups and protectionism.
There are many examples show-
ing that protectionism is often detri-
mental for the environment. Three
of the most prominent examples are
highlighted: the voluntary export re-
straint (VER) of Japanese car pro-
ducers, the U.S. agricultural protec-
tion and subsidy, and the protection
of U.S. and European producers of so-
lar panels.
In 1981 Japan agreed to constrain
their exports of cars to the U.S.
There were two notable results. The
first is that prices for Japanese cars
increased. But, more importantly,
Japan exported larger cars that used
more gas (petrol) than the smaller
and more fuel-efficient cars it mostly
exported before the quota was intro-
duced.
Overall the voluntary export con-
straint was a huge disappointment.
Not only did economic welfare de-
crease but the environment suffered
as well.
To protect the U.S. sugar grow-
ers, the U.S. imposed a sugar quota
as discussed in the previous section.
To the negative effects of this quota
on jobs and consumers, we can now
add harming the environment.
Rather than using sugar to pro-
duce ethanol, corn is used. But corn
is 7 times less efficient than sugar
cane. Corn production in the U.S. is
requires large amounts of water and
fertilizer. Sugar cane production in
Brazil relies on rain and uses only
small amounts of fertilizer.
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To encourage domestic produc-
tion, the U.S. government grants tax
credits to ethanol producers. At the
same time it imposes high import
tariffs to prevent imports of cheaper
sugar-based ethanol. Abolishing the
sugar subsidy and the import restric-
tions would help the environment.
Last but not least the U.S. as well
as the EU tried to protect their do-
mestic solar panel production against
imports from China. The U.S. im-
posed a tariff, and the EU relied on
“voluntary” constraint. But the ef-
fect was the same. Prices of so-
lar panels increased. Installation of
panels in private households as well
as businesses became more expensive.
With fewer panels installed, the re-
sult of protection has been to damage
the environment as well as to harm
consumers.
4.14 Trade can harm
There are examples where trade
harmed the environment. For ex-
ample, overfishing. Without interna-
tional markets that allowed their sale,
overfishing would probably not have
happened.
In the 1980s the rapid expansion
of coastal shrimp-farming in Asia and
Latin America harmed the environ-
ment. It used large quantities of fresh
water which resulted in the contam-
ination of fresh water with salt wa-
ter. Ultimately this damaged the
mangrove forests that are the natu-
ral habitat for wild shrimp and fish,
resulting in the loss of livelihood for
other fishermen.
Agricultural protection in Europe
does not only make European con-
sumers pay high prices but it ex-
cludes people from poor countries to
sell their produce. The environment
suffers since much larger quantities
of pesticides are required than un-
der free trade. EU agricultural subsi-
dies can be described in a few short
words: higher subsidy = more pesti-
cides used.
That pesticides are necessary to
produce enough food for the current
world population is a myth, debunked
in a 2017 UN report. The report
also finds that there are an estimated
200,000 deaths each year due to poi-
soning from pesticides. Most of these
deaths occur in developing countries
where regulation is often lax.
Any measure that moves produc-
tion away from heavy pesticide users
and improves handling of pesticides
in developing countries will be bene-
ficial for the environment. The EU
slashed their protection would be a
first step.
Another study found that cer-
tain types of pesticides (neonicoti-
noid insecticides) are harmful to bees.
Assuming that using pesticides that
passed all the required tests are en-
vironmentally benign when used on
an industrial scale is certainly naive.
Although the new Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP) is supposed to be
greener, it is unlikely to benefit biodi-
versity in the EU. A study conducted
by the EU itself, finds that some mea-
sures of the CAP can have negative
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environmental impact.
Besides the negative environmen-
tally impact, EU agriculture protec-
tion continues to hurt the most vul-
nerable: farmers in developing coun-
tries. Despite reduced subsidies and
lower average tariffs, the EU’s agri-
cultural market is still highly exclu-
sive. Less developed countries out-
side the EU are effectively cut off
from one of the biggest agricultural
markets.
Furthermore, due to overproduc-
tion in the EU, it became a exporter
of food. Selling large quantities of
subsidised food on the international
market, directly competing with de-
veloping countries and their farmers.
The U.S., which also has a
highly protected agricultural sector
(although less subsidised), has its fair
share of scandals. For example, inten-
sive farming in South Florida is dam-
aging the Everglades’s unique ecosys-
tem.
Protecting the agricultural sector
in developed countries has detrimen-
tal effects on the environment and
farmers in developing countries. Fur-
thermore, it creates inequality with
the highest subsidies going to large
farms or large landholders.
4.15 Buying local?
Do you believe buying local farm
produce is better for the environ-
ment than buying thos imported from
abroad? Surely the little farm just
outside the town must be better for
the environment as it does not have
to ship its produce around the world.
This reasoning is not entirely ac-
curate. Transporting goods around
the world is, perhaps surprisingly, not
as damaging as one might suspect.
And 80% of the emissions caused by
food are in the production phase.
Transportation is only responsible for
11% of emissions. Getting the food
from the producer to the retailer rep-
resents only 4% of total emissions.
Buying local also ignores other
factors such as the land use, the
type of transportation, weather or
even seasons. For example, New
Yorkers drinking wine from Bordeaux
harm the environment less than those
drinking Californian wine. Why? Be-
cause transport by ship is less polut-
ing than transporting by truck.
Another example are dairy, lamb
and apples from New Zealand.
Putting these on the table of a UK
consumer has less environmental im-
pact than the same products pro-
duced in the UK. Transporting goods
around the world is often better for
the environment than producing it lo-
cally. Even roses that are flown in
by air from Kenya cause less envi-
ronmental impact than those that are
grown in the Netherlands and then
shipped to the UK. Dutch growers use
vastly more energy for heating and
lighting to cultivate roses.
These results illustrate that it is
often more important to consider un-
der what conditions a good is pro-
duced than where it is produced.
Transporting goods by trucks over
long distance can be worse than send
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it around the world by ship.
If you want to reduce your en-
vironmental footprint, forget about
buying local. Shift your consumption
to chicken, fish, eggs or vegetable-
based diets. And buy less red meat
and dairy products. This really has
an impact on reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.
4.16 Eat kangaroos
The authors of SuperFreakonomics,
Steve Levitt and Steph Dubner, rec-
ommend the consumption of Kanga-
roo meat rather than red meat. Kan-
garoos allegedly produce very little
methane when farting.
Although recent research has re-
vealed that Kangaroo farts do contain
a substantial amount of methane, it
is around a third to a quarter of the
levels produced by cows (who burp).
Methane is harmful to the envi-
ronment and one of the biggest is-
sues with red meat production. Aus-
tralia is experiencing an overpopula-
tion of Kangaroos, putting its biodi-
versity at danger. Consuming Kan-
garoo meat would not only help Aus-
tralia, it would also help he environ-
ment. Give it a try.
4.17 Politics
Protectionism is often pushed by spe-
cial interest groups, unions claim-
ing they care about the environ-
ment and the working standards in
low-wage country. Restrictions ulti-
mately serve to protect their mem-
bers’ jobs. Industries that lose com-
petitiveness also try to get protection.
Although protectionism often carries
a high cost for consumers, there is
very little protest from this group.
Further trade liberalization in de-
veloped countries would have surpris-
ingly small welfare effects. In the
U.S. the average import tariff is only
1.5% (prior to the 2018/9 trade war).
Abolishing all significant trade barri-
ers is estimated to increase national
expenditure by $3.3 billion per year.
This equate a welfare gain of 0.02%
of GDP.
Considering the small effects on
the economy overall and the large ef-
fects on affected workers, those that
stand to lose from trade are fiercely
opposed to any trade liberalization
that puts their livelihood at risk while
consumers and tax payers care much
less.
In political sciences researchers of-
ten apply the median voter model. It
says that the actual policy in a coun-
try represents the preferences of the
median voter. Although often criti-
cised, there is empirical evidence that
it is still a good foundation to explore
decision making in politics.
According to this model, policies
that hurt the majority and benefit
few are not possible to implement,
simply because politicians w1ant to
be re-elected. Ignoring the majority
will make winning the next election
less likely.
In the U.S., just like the sugar
industry, the dairy industry and the
textiles and apparel sector are also
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highly protected. The protection
benefits few - workers in these sectors.
But it hurts the vast majority of con-
sumers as a result of higher prices.
How can this happen? It should
not according to the mean voter
model as politicians keep policies that
are hurting the majority.
The American economist Man-
cur Olson presented the answer to
this problem in his book “The Logic
of Collective action”: Larger groups
face greater difficulty in organiz-
ing their members to come together
and take collective actions. Smaller
groups do not face the same problem.
As a result their interests can be over-
represented.
How does this apply to trade?
Imagine Jane, a fictitious American
consumer, reads the previous pages
and concludes that sugar subsidies
should be abolished. She writes an
email to her congresswoman. The
congresswoman listens, takes action,
and the subsidies are abolished. All
consumers benefit from lower sugar
prices, not only Jane who wrote the
letter.
This is a typical case of a public
good. Although not everybody con-
tributed to the outcome, all benefit.
All but Jane had a free ride. Indi-
viduals therefore have little incentive
to participate in a collective action.
This free-rider problem is essential to
understanding trade policy.
One letter from Jane is unlikely to
have the desired effect. Jane knows
that. A single household’s gain from
trade liberalization in the sugar sec-
tor is approximately equal to $2.88
per year. Would you write a letter
that is unlikely to even achieve this
minor saving? However, you would
write a letter if your job depends on
it.
That is what is happening in
trade policy. Agriculture is pro-
tected in most developing countries
despite employing only a small frac-
tion of people in those countries. But
because agriculture is such a small
group, it can easily activate its mem-
bers and lobby more successfully for
protection.
Economists have studied this
topic in much detail. There is stag-
gering evidence that special interest
groups have tremendous influence on
politicians’ actions and can affect the
outcomes of political decision mak-
ing. Scott Bradford finds that U.S.
policy makers weighh a dollar in cam-
paign contribution 15% higher than a
dollar of consumer surplus.
Protected industries have much to
lose, whereas consumers gain only lit-
tle. Lobbying their representatives to
keep protection in place and spend-
ing huge amount of money to get
their voice heard makes sense. Con-
sumers are much less willing to lobby
and take collective action. No won-
der protection persists and free trade
is often not to be found.
4.18 Dumping
Current tools to shield industries
from harmful competition include
anti-dumping duties. These du-
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ties are levied on products that are
“dumped” by foreign producers on
our market. That is, the price is be-
low that of the product’s market price
in the exporter’s country.
Evidence suggests that over time
legislation has made it easier to claim
protection from dumping. Most anti-
dumping legislation is protection in
disguise. It has nothing to do with
making trade “fair”.
Stopping dumping reduces im-
ports and raises prices. Producers
have a clear incentive to blame for-
eign firms of dumping whether there
is proof or not. A measure created to
ensure fair competition, can get hi-
jacked and becomes a tool for protec-
tion.
4.19 Sunset clause
Once policies are in place, they are
hard to revise or abolish. Either
would mean taking away benefits
from those who, ehm, benefit. Anti-
dumping legislation did not get re-
pealed but became more detrimental
to foreign competitors.
During the Korean war, mohair
goats were produced as their wool was
useful in making warm uniforms. Af-
ter the war the protection was kept
for another 40 years despite no rea-
son whatsoever to keep it in place.
4.20 Uncertain benefits
Freeing trade comes with a lot of un-
certainty. Spotting the future win-
ners from free trade is hard. But pro-
tected industries know exactly what
they stand to lose. No wonder policy
makers suffer from a status quo bias.
Dani Rodrik illustrates this uncer-
tainty and the resulting effect on pol-
icy very nicely in one of his papers.
Imagine a economy with 100 voters.
A policy reform would increase the in-
comes of 51 voters by $5 each. But it
would decrease the income of the oth-
ers by $1 each. So the policy would
have a net gain of (51 x $5) – (49 x
$1) =$206.
The 49 voters know for sure that
they will lose but the 51 others do
not know whether they will gain or
lose from the policy. The 49 losers
will vote against the policy and some
of the others will do so as well. A
beneficial policy is rejected.
Another interesting finding by
Dani Rodrik is that countries that
are more exposed to trade also have
higher governmental spending. In-
creased spending by governments
provides better social insurance to
support those who lose from more
openness. In Europe people that lose
out from international trade are more
likely to vote for parties that offer
generous social programmes.
To help reducing the negative im-
pact of international trade, the U.S.
have a special policy tool called the
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA).
The EU has the European Global-
ization Adjustment Fund (EGF) in
place.
The efficiency of such programmes
is unclear. In principle, paying unem-
ployment benefits for a longer period
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does increase the probability of get-
ting a better job or a job that matches
the particular skill set. But TAA in
the U.S. has not yet proven to have
a positive impact on the employment
outcomes of participants. The EGF
is underused and seems to have had
only limited success in combating the
adverse outcomes from globalization.
4.21 Jobs and jobs
Increasing governmental spending to
soften the adverse effects from trade
suggests that jobs lost due to inter-
national trade are somehow differ-
ent to jobs lost due to other factors.
Whether the workers agree is doubt-
ful.
4.22 Globalisation
Often people fear with increasing
trade liberalization their home coun-
try loses its sovereignty and becomes
subject to universal rules. This does
not happen. Even within a customs
union (like the EU single market)
countries can design their own social
policies and maintain different insti-
tutions and laws.
In fact borders are still a quite im-
portant obstacle to trade. Although
trade agreements often abolish most
formal trade barriers such as tariffs
and quotas, these agreements do not
render borders obsolete. John Mc-
Callum found that trade between the
U.S. and Canada, despite being virtu-
ally free of most trade barriers, is still
less than trade within Canada itself.
The U.S.-Canadian orders still has a
decisive effect on trade patterns.
Even within the EU single mar-
ket, trade patterns are not entirely
free of the influence of national bor-
ders. The world is not as integrated
as one might think seeing the abun-
dance of international goods in a su-
permarket.
If you have not yet be at least a
little bit more positive about interna-
tional trade, there are some interest-
ing insights that should convince you
that you should become a fan. Trade
deters conflicts and promotes peace.
Trade is linked to increasing democ-
ratization.
Both results show that trade can
be much more than the exchange of
goods and services, trade can be a
force promoting peace and democ-
racy.
4.23 Behavioural biases
Behavioural economics research indi-
cates that human nature can hinder
trade. One such example is known
as the endowment effect. The endow-
ment effect is that we value things
that we own more than things that
we do not own.
This can lead to some interest-
ing conclusions. We are more likely
to keep an object than to acquire
the same object if we do not own it.
It will also lead to difficulties selling
some items, as we value our item at
a higher price than what our buyer is
willing to pay. This principle has even
been observed in Ancient times by
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Aristotle: “For most things are differ-
ently valued by those who have them
and by those who wish to get them:
what belongs to us, and what we give
away, always seems very precious to
us.” However, as we have seen trough-
out this report, trade is happening.
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5 Conclusion
Aristotle said “It is the mark of an
educated mind to be able to entertain
a thought without accepting it.”
Whether you were a friend or foe
of free trade when reading the title of
this work, we hope you enjoyed the
short excursion into the fascinating
world of free trade. We touched upon
many issues of international trade.
But of course there is so much more
to discover. The extensive literature
sections at the end of each chapter
provides a starting point to the many
books and articles written about ev-
ery aspect of trade.
Politicians, lobbyists and ac-
tivists’ views on international trade
might seem bewildering and often
crazy. Our current world holds a new
surprise for im- and exporting indus-
tries virtually every day.
We believe it is important to
understand the arguments for and
against trade and to be able to eval-
uate the impact of changes in trade
policy. Understanding other peoples’
arguments, or at least knowing why
they believe what they believe, is
key. Because without understand-
ing the position of someone else, we
cannot engage in a constructive dis-
cussion. Without constructive argu-
ments there will be no understanding
and no progress. This is particularly
true for a controversial topic such as
international trade.
Our aim was to familiarise the
reader with the many aspects of
trade: why trade happens, how trade
shaped history, the positive and neg-
ative impact of trade. It is up to
the reader to make the most out of
this information when refecting about
current debate and views put forward
for and against international trade.
We hope you can now talk the talk!
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